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INEQUITABLE ADMINISTRATION:
DOCUMENTING FAMILY FOR TAX

PURPOSES
ANTHONY C. INFANTI*
Abstract
Family can bring us joy, and it can bring us grief It can
also bring us tax benefits and tax detriments. Often, as a means
of ensuring compliance with Internal Revenue Code provisions
that turn on a family relationship, taxpayers are required to
document their relationship with a family member Most visibly,
taxpayers are denied an additionalpersonal exemption for a
child or other dependent unless they furnish the individual's
name, Social Security number,and relationshipto the taxpayer
In this article, I undertake the first systematic examination
of these documentation requirements. Given the privileging of
the "traditional"family throughout the Code, one might expect
to see that same privileging mirrored in the administrative
structure that underpins the Code s family tax provisions.
Indeed, on their very face, the information-reportingrules that
apply to jointly owned income-producingproperty do just that.
Once the inquiry is expanded to cover other family tax
provisions, however, it quickly becomes clear that the
administrative structure underpinning the family tax provisions
has also been strongly influenced by endemic privilegings along
a variety of other axes of subordination-from class to race to
gender to sexual orientation. To address and remedy these
defects in the administrative structure underpinning the family
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to

Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Bridget Crawford, and Lily Kahng as well as to the
participants at the Third National People of Color Conference-especially the
commentator on my paper, Peter Alexander-for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article. As always, thanks to Hicn for his love and support in
everything that I do.
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tax provisions, this article advocates an approach to
documenting family for tax purposes that does not invidiously
discriminateamong taxpayers.
INTRODUCTION
Family is important to each of us-no matter whether it is
the family that we are born into, the family that we choose, or
the family that chooses us. Family also plays an important role
in determining the size of our tax bills. For instance, having a
child may render a taxpayer eligible for the child tax credit, an
additional personal exemption, and tax relief for childcare costs
incurred to enable her to be gainfully employed.' In addition to
these benefits, the expenses of adopting a child may be
creditable against the taxpayer's tax bill. 2 Taking in a family
member or friend might also permit the taxpayer to claim an
additional personal exemption and to deduct medical or other
expenses paid on that person's behalf. 3 Where the ownership of
an interest in a corporation or partnership is relevant to
determining tax liability, the taxpayer's ownership is often
aggregated with that of her family members-sometimes to the
taxpayer's benefit and at other times to her detriment. 4 Similarly,
families are sometimes treated as a larger economic unit for tax
purposes, with the individual members presumed to be
indifferent to the allocation of legal ownership of assets among
them. 5 Moreover, the decision to remain single or to couple

I I.R.C. §§ 21, 24, 129, 151 (LEXIS through July 2010 amendments).
2 Id. § 36C.

3 Id. §§ 151, 152(d), 213; see also infra Part 11for a discussion of the
many tax provisions that provide benefits to a taxpayer with respect to her
dependents.
4 I.R.C. §§ 267, 318; see Anthony C. infanti, Bringing Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity into the Tax Classroom, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 13 (2009)

(explaining this point with examples).
5 I.R.C. §§ I(g), 1361(c)(1).
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opens a veritable
(whether within or without marriage)
6
Pandora's box of tax consequences.
When taking family into account for all of these purposes,
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) clearly privileges the socalled traditional family over all others. Lesbian and gay
families fit uncomfortably, if at all, into the nonnative structure
of the Code. 7 Married women who work outside the home may
be penalized for this decision. 8 And other nontraditional

6 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and
White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787 (1997) (explaining the impact ofthe tax incentives
relating to marriage upon African-American different-sex couples); Anthony C.
Infanti, The Ihternal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
763 (2004) (discussing the tax issues faced by same-sex couples and unmarried
different-sex couples); Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tar
Laws Governing Joint and Several Tax Liability, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261 (2004)
(discussing the lack of a coherent rationale for the joint and several liability that
accompanies the filing of a joint return); Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest
Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651
(2010) [hereinafter Kahng, Loneliest Number] (discussing thc lack of a coherent
rationale for the joint and several liability that accompanies the filing of a joint
return and also discussing tax issues faced by single taxpayers); Edward J.
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases
in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1992) (discussing the impact of the tax laws
on decisions to marry, to have a one- or two-carer household, and to work full
or part time); Mylinh Uy, Note, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian Americans,
II ASIAN L.J. 117 (2004) (explaining the impact of the tax incentives relating to
marriage upon Asian-American diffcrent-sex couples).
7 See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, Dismembering Families, in CHALLENGING
GENDER

INEQUALITY IN TAX POLICY MAKING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

(Kim Brooks et al., eds., 2011) (explaining how the medical expense deduction
in I.R.C. § 213 constructs, corporealizes, and dismembers families); Nancy J.
Knauer, Heteronormalivity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129
(1998) (explaining how marital status is pervasive in the tax laws and how the
provisions relating to the taxation of the family are prescriptive in nature); see
also infra note 118.

' See MeCaffery, supra note 6, at 988-1013.
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families 9 often fall through the cracks. t For example, in
Leonard v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer
who supported a disabled friend and the friend's grandchildren
-all of whom lived with her-was eligible to claim an
additional personal exemption for each of the children but was
ineligible to claim the child-care credit, the child tax credit, the
additional child tax credit, or the earned income credit because
those same children were not "qualifying" children.I'
In this Article, I break new ground by undertaking the first
systematic examination of the administrative structure that
underpins the Code's family tax provisions. 12 In this
examination, I focus on the presence or absence of requirements
to identify and document a taxpayer's family members. Though,
as a working hypothesis, one might expect these identification
and documentation requirements simply to mirror the Code's
I For descriptions of family arrangements that do-or might--depart from
the "traditional" nuclear family norm, see Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family
of Choice and Need, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691 (1996-1997); Angela Mac
Kupcnda, Two Parents Are Better than None: Whether Two Single, African
American Adults-Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or Romantic or
Sexual Relationship with Each Other Should Be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and
Co-ParentAfrican American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703 (19961997).
10 See generally Wendy C. Gcrzog, Families for Tax Purposes: W~hat
About the Steps?, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805 (2009) (describing the
inconsistent treatment of stepfamily as family members for federal income and
transfer tax purposes).
II Leonard v. Comm'r, T.C. Sumr. Op. 2008-141 (T.C. 2008).
12 For the sake of maintaining a sharper focus and to keep the length of
this article manageable, I have confined my discussion to the income tax.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a variety of estate tax provisions also take
family into account. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2036(b)(2), 2057(c) (LEXIS through
July 2010 amendments). The risk of audit for an estate tax return is, however,
much higher than for an individual income tax return, which arguably makes
alternative compliance measures (e.g., the identification and documentation
requirements that are the subject of this Article) less important. On average, the
risk of audit for an estate tax return in fiscal year 2008 was about 8%, while that
same risk was only I% for an individual income tax return. I.R.S. PUB. No. 55B,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, DATA BOOK, 2008, at 23 tbl.9a

(2009). This eightfold increase in the risk of audit more than doubled-indeed,
in fiscal year 2008, it skyrocketed to nearly 20/o--where large estates (i.e., those
with a gross estate of at least $5million) were concerned. Id.
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ubiquitous privileging of the "traditional" family,' 3 the picture is
actually rendered far more complex by the influence of
privilegings along a number of interconnected axes of
subordination.
Such an intricate web of interconnected subordination is
precisely what we would expect to see when the dominant group
in society obtains and maintains its status as such at least in part
through control of the flow of ideas-what Antonio Gramsci
referred to as "hegemony." As Douglas Litowitz has noted,
"Gramsci's work on hegemony provides a useful starting point
for legal scholars who understand that domination is often
subtle, invisible, and consensual."' 4 Though I have provided a
fuller description of Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony
elsewhere, 15 this short recapitulation of the concept nicely
highlights its relevance here:
By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation
throughout civil society-including a whole
range of structures and activities like trade
unions, schools, the churches, and the family
-of an entire system of values, attitudes,
beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or
another supportive of the established order and
the class interests that dominate it. Hegemony
in this sense might be defined as an
"organizing principle", or world-view (or
combination of such world-views), that is
diffused by agencies of ideological control and
socialization into every area of daily life. To
the extent that this prevailing consciousness is
internalized by the broad masses, it becomes
13See Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the United States
and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 316-27 (2010) [hcreinafter Kahng,
hivestment Income Withholding] (describing how the privileging of income from
capital over income from labor in the rate structure and taxbase is mirrored in
enforcement provisions).
14 Douglas Litowitz, Gransci, Hegemony anid the Law, 2000 BYU L.
REV. 515,519.

15 Anthony C. Infanti, Tax gqmity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1242-49

(2008).

334
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part of "common sense"; as all ruling elites
seek to perpetuate their power, wealth, and
status, they necessarily attempt to popularize
their own philosophy, culture, morality, etc.
and render them unchallengeable, part of the
natural order of things. 16
It should come as no surprise, then, that the interconnecting lines
of subordination in the administrative structure underpinning the
family tax provisions are not the result of deliberate action by
Congress or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). They are
instead the product of "endemic" privilegings-that is,.
privilegings that have become so normal, so ingrained in our
nature, such a part of our "world-view" that they manifest
themselves without conscious thought.
Our unearthing of the endemic privilegings embedded in
the identification and documentation requirements in the Code's
family tax provisions will proceed in three parts. In Part I, we
begin our analysis with an examination of the informationreporting requirements that attach to jointly owned incomeproducing property. This examination reveals the expected
influence of the privileging of heterosexuality and different-sex
marriage upon the administrative structure underpinning the
family tax provisions in the Code. It also begins to complicate
the expected picture by demonstrating how this privileging of
the "traditional" family concomitantly reinforces privilegings
along other axes of subordination.
The next two parts of the article work in tandem, as their
import only truly emerges when we juxtapose them and compare
and contrast the provisions discussed in each of them. In Part II,
we will examine the deductions, credits, and exclusions that are
provided (or, conversely, denied) to a taxpayer with respect to
her family members. From the taxpayer's perspective, these are
perhaps the most salient family tax provisions in the Code. From
any perspective, they are also the provisions that do the most to
convey a sense of randomness in the administrative structure
underpinning the family tax provisions and lend support for the
notion that the privilegings embedded in that administrative
16CARL BOGGS, GRAMSCI'S MARXISM 39 (1976).
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structure are a manifestation of Gramscian hegemony.
Nonetheless, these provisions, like the information-reporting
rules described in Part I, clearly establish a baseline of
identification and documentation of family members.
In Part III, we will examine the rules that attribute
ownership of property between family members-from the
conventional rules attributing the ownership of stock among
family members, to business and investment incentives that
disregard transactions among family members either to prevent
abuse or to facilitate the delivery of tax incentives, to the
"kiddie" tax that prevents parents from assigning investment
income to their minor children, and so on. The dearth of
identification and documentation requirements in the numerous
and varied provisions covered in Part III stands in stark contrast
to the general baseline of identification and documentation that
we will have encountered in Part II (and, for that matter, even in
Part I) of this Article.
In this contrast, we will detect the influence of endemic
privilegings along a number of axes of subordination. It will
become clear that the wealthy are subjected to less stringent
reporting requirements than low- or middle-income taxpayers
when it comes to identifying and documenting family members.
We will explore how this class-based privileging implicates and
intersects privilegings along other axes of subordination,
including race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and marital
status.
Throughout the Article, it will become apparent that, even
though Congress and the IRS have not taken a deliberative
approach when imposing identification and documentation
requirements, endemic privilegings along multiple axes of
subordination have subtly influenced the decision whether or not
to employ identification and documentation requirements as a
tool for enforcing the Code's family tax provisions. To redress
this unconscious discrimination, the concluding section of this
article will advocate a more uniform and deliberative approach
to documenting family for tax purposes-and one that does not
invidiously discriminate among taxpayers. I suggest that the
baseline of requiring identification and documentation of family
members be applied to all of the Code's family tax provisions in
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the name of increasing both tax compliance and the evenhanded
enforcement of the tax laws. In keeping with these twin goals,
exceptions from the identification and documentation
requirements should be carved out only where there are valid,
articulable, and nondiscriminatory reasons for departing from
the common baseline of reporting family relationships.
I.

Information-Reporting Rules

In this Part, we begin our examination of the identification
and documentation requirements in the Code's family tax
provisions by looking at the information-reporting rules that
apply to jointly held income-producing property. More
particularly, we will consider the Form 1099 informationreporting requirements that apply to jointly owned interest,
dividend, and royalty payments. These information-reporting
requirements are designed to "provide[] a strong incentive to
taxpayers to include payments in their personal tax returns and
thus avoid noncompliance issues with the IRS. Payments not
reportable on Forms 1099 tend to be ignored by taxpayers and
'17
thus escape taxation.
As we will see, these information-reporting rules have two
distinctly different faces. The public face of these rules is
embodied in the IRS's general instructions for the various
iterations of the Form 1099. These instructions paint a very neat
(and very heteronormative) picture of the information-reporting
requirements. The private face of these rules-the one
encountered by those who go behind the IRS's published
instructions to look at the underlying sections of the Code and
Treasury regulations-is not nearly so neat. An examination of
the Code and Treasury regulations reveals dissonances both
between the coverage of the different information-reporting
provisions as well as contradictions between the Code and
Treasury regulations, on one hand, and the IRS's general
instructions for the Form 1099, on the other. These dissonances
will help to highlight the expected privileging of the
"traditional" family in the administrative structure underpinning
the Code's family tax provisions as well as begin to reveal how
17Carol A. Kasscm, Iformation Reporting to U.S. Persons, Tax Mgmt.
Portfolio (BNA) No. 643, at A- I (2011).
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that privileging at the same time connects with and reinforces
privilegings along other axes of subordination.
A. The Public Face of the InformationReporting Rules
Certain payments of interest, dividends, and royalties are
required to be reported to taxpayers-with a copy of the report
furnished to the IRS-on Form 1099-INT, Form 1099-DIV, and
Form 1099-MISC, respectively. These information-reporting
rules are designed to increase taxpayer compliance in reporting
these items of income. 18 Yet, they raise interesting questions for
those who jointly receive payments of these items of income. 19
Anyone who holds a bank account jointly with a spouse,
domestic partner, family member, or friend knows that the bank
completes and submits only one Form 1099-INT with respect to
each account, using the taxpayer identification number of just
one account holder. 20 But how can the account holder who
receives the Form 1099-INT be sure that the IRS does not
attempt to tax her on more interest (or, for that matter, dividend
or royalty) income than she is actually entitled to?

'8 See infi'a note 96.

have chosen to focus on these three information-reporting
because of this Article's focus on documenting family. Other
information-reporting requirements generally apply only to persons engaged in a
trade or business and only with respect to transactions occurring in the course of
that trade or business. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6041, 6045 (LEXIS through July 2010
amendments). Any resulting reporting would, therefore, principally stem from a
business (and not a family) relationship.
19

1

requirements

20 I.R.S. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CERTAIN INFORMATION RETURNS 8

(2009) [hereinafter GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS]:
If payments have been made to more than one recipient or
the account is in more than one name, show on the first
name line the name of the recipient whose TIN is first
shown on the return. You may show the names of any
other individual recipients in the area below the first line, if desired.
(emphasis added).
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The solution to this problem is found in the general
instructions for Form 1099, which explain the reporting
obligations that apply to the joint account holder who receives
the Form 1099. These instructions adopt a default position that
requires taxpayers to identify and document the sharing of
jointly owned interest, dividend, and royalty income:
Generally, if you receive a Form 1099 for
amounts that actually belong to another
person, you are considered a nominee
recipient. You must file a Form 1099 with the
IRS (the same type of Form 1099 you
received) for each of the other owners showing
the amounts allocable to each. You must also
furnish a Form 1099 to each of the other
owners. File the new Form 1099 with Form
1096 with the Internal Revenue Service Center
for your area. On each new Form 1099, list
yourself as the "payer" and the other owner as
the "recipient." On Form 1096, list yourself as
the "filer." A husband or wife is not requiredto
file a nominee return to show amounts owned
by the other 21
This imposes a burden on the joint owner who receives the
Form 1099 (the first joint owner) to then complete another Form
1099 for the other joint owner (the second joint owner). The first
joint owner must provide the Form 1099 to the second joint
owner and submit a copy to the IRS along with the transmittal
Form 1096. But the first joint owner cannot simply download an
additional Forn 1099 and a Form 1096 from the IRS's web site,
complete them, and furnish them to the second joint owner and
the IRS. Rather, the forms must be ordered from the IRS,
received by regular mail, and then completed and furnished to

21 Id. at

2 (cmphasis added).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER ANDLAW

the second joint owner and the IRS. 22 When the first joint owner
does not learn of this reporting obligation until late in the filing
season, the possibility of failing to timely file (and of incurring
penalties) is significant. 23
In addition, the first joint owner is required to backup
withhold at a flat rate of 28% (and pay any withheld tax over to
the IRS) if the second joint owner does not furnish the first joint
owner with a Form W-9 that (1)includes the second joint
owner's taxpayer identification number, (2) certifies Linder
penalties of perjury that this taxpayer identification number is
correct, and (3) further certifies that the second joint owner is
not subject to withholding due to notified payee
underreporting. 24 The first joint owner must then retain the
relevant records and forms "so long as the contents thereof may
become material in the administration of any internal revenue
law." 25
22 Most federal taxforms are available for downloading from http://
www.irs.gov. A search for Form 1099-DIV, Form 1099-INT, Form 1099-MISC,
and Form 1096 reveals that only an information copy is available on the IRS's
web site. In each case, a cover page appears before this information copy of the
form that advises the taxpayer that the form must be ordered from the IRS and
received by mail. The cover page further warns that submitting a downloaded
copy of the fon may result in the imposition of a penalty.

23 The Form 1099 is required to be furnished to the second joint owner by
January 31 of the year following the calendar year with respect to which
information is being reported, even though that is the same deadline for the
actual payer of interest, dividends, or royalties to furnish the initial Form 1099 to
the first joint account owner. I.R.C. §§ 6042(c) (flush language), 6049(c)(2),
6050N(b) (flush language). The copy of Form 1099 and the transmittal Form
1096 must be furnished to the IRS by February 28 of the year following the
calendar year with respect to which information is being reported. Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.6042-2(c) (as amended in 2000), 1.6049-4(g)(1) (as amended in 2006); see
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 20, at 4. For the applicable penalty for
failure to timely file an information return, see I.R.C. § 6721. This penalty may
be waived upon a showing of reasonable cause. i.§ 6724.

24 I.R.C. §§ 3406(a)(l)(A), 6302; Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3406(a)-I
-2(a) (as amended in 2002), 31.3406(b)(2)-I(a)(I) (1995), -4(a)
31.3406(b)(3)-4(a) (1995), 31.3406(d)-I(a), (b)(3) (1995), 31.3406(d)-2
31.3406(h)-2(t)(3) (as amended in 2002), 31.3406-3 (as amended in
3 1.6302-4 (1993).

(1995),
(1995),
(1995),
2000),

25 Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(c) (as amended in 1990); see generally id. §
1.6001-1 (a).
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Interestingly, as the italicized final sentence of the block
quote above indicates, these additional reporting and
withholding burdens are not imposed on married different-sex
couples. Why are married different-sex couples singled out for
relief from these burdens? A natural response to this question
might be that imposing the information-reporting and backupwithholding requirements is'unnecessary when the spouses file a
joint return, because all of the interest (or dividends or royalties)
will be reported on the return that the spouses file together. But
the exception in the instructions is not confined to married
couples filing jointly. By its terms, it applies equally to married
couples filing separately-who will be filing not one, but two
returns. In that situation, why isn't the spouse who receives the
Form 1099 treated like every other joint owner and required to
report to the IRS the share of the income that belongs to (and
should be taxed to) another taxpayer? The fact that married
different-sex spouses who file separately must provide each
other's names and Social Security numbers on their tax returns is
not a sufficient answer to this question. 26 The taxpayer's spouse
is not the only person who might jointly hold title to interest-,
dividend-, or royalty-producing property with the taxpayer. The
number of married different-sex taxpayers choosing to file
separate returns is comparatively low but, with more than 2.7
million such returns filed in 2008, far from insignificant. 27 Why
not impose the same reporting burden on them as is imposed on
others, rather than shifting the burden onto the IRS only for this
one particular, "special" group?
The general instructions thus provide support for the
working hypothesis articulated in the introduction to this Article.
26 I.R.S. FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN, at

1(2009).

27 In 2008, there were 2,717,037 returns filed under the marricd filing
separately status and 53,655,844 returns filed under the married filing jointly
status. I.R.S. PuB. No. 1304, STATISTICS OF INCOME-2008, INDIVIDUAL INCOME

TAX RETURNS 40 tbl.I.3 (2010). Though married filing separately returns are
comparatively smaller in number, it is still quite an administrative task for the
IRS to ensure that, together, all 2.7 million of these returns report a total amount
of income equal to that reported to the IRS by third parties as interest, dividends,
and royalties separately under the names of each of these spouses. And, it is
worth noting that more than 2.7 million taxpayers may actually be involved here,
as one of the spouses filing separately may fall under the threshold for filing a
return.

22.2
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The administrative structure underpinning the reporting of
jointly owned interest, dividend, and royalty income evidences a
clear privileging of the "traditional" family. Without any
apparent justification, the IRS has carved out an exception for all
married different-sex spouses from an identification and
documentation requirement intended to increase compliance.
Yet, the evidence of this privileging becomes even clearer once
we look behind the public face of these information-reporting
rules and scrutinize the Treasury regulations underlying them.
B.

The Private Face of the Information-Reporting
Rules

The regulations governing information reporting with
respect to interest, dividends, and royalties are not entirely
consistent with the picture painted by the general instructions for
Form 1099. Only the interest-reporting regulations are consistent
with those instructions. The royalty-reporting regulations may be
interpreted to embrace a similar consistency with the
instructions; however, the dividend-reporting regulations are
clearly inconsistent with the instructions-but are far less
burdensome on taxpayers.
1.

Section 6049: Interest Reporting

The information-reporting rules regarding interest
payments do appear to correspond with the description in the
general instructions for Form 1099. Section 6049 requires those
who pay $10 or more in interest, those who receive and disburse
payments of $10 or more of interest as a nominee, as well as
those who act as middlemen to file an information return. 28 The
regulations confirm the obligation of those acting as middlemen
to report interest payments. 29 For this purpose, the regulations
provide:
A person shall be considered to be a
middleman as to any portion of an interest
payment made to such person which portion is
28 I.R.C.

§ 6049(a), (d)(4).

29 Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(a)(I), -4(a)(2)(ii), -4(b)(3)(i) (as amcnded in
2006).
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actually owned by another person, whether or
not the other person's name is also shown on
the information return filed with respect to
such interest payment, except that a husband
or wife will not be considered as acting in the
capacity of 30a middleman with respect to his or
her spouse.
This broad definition of "middleman" comports with the general
instructions for Form 1099.
2. Section 6050N: Royalty Reporting
Arguably, the rules regarding the reporting of royalty
payments also correspond with that description. Like the
interest-reporting rules, § 6050N requires those who pay $10 or
more in royalties as well as those who receive and disburse
payments of $10 or more of royalties as a nominee to file an
information return. 31 However, in contrast to § 6049, no mention
is made of middlemen in the text of § 6050N. Nevertheless, the
regulations under § 6050N, though rather sparse, do incorporate
by reference the definition of "payor" from the interest-reporting
regulations. 32 That definition, in turn, specifically references and
incorporates the definition of "middleman" in the interestreporting regulations quoted above. Though the placement of
this incorporation by reference in the royalty regulations seems
to be aimed specifically at an exemption from reporting for
certain foreign-related items, it does apply to "this section,"
which would seem to mean the entirety of Treasury Regulation §
1.6050N- I and not just the exemption for certain foreign-related
items. Accordingly, it is possible to read the regulations under
§ 6050N as likewise comporting with the general instructions for
Form 1099.
3.

Section 6042: Dividend Reporting

30Id. § 1.6049-4(f)(4)(i).
31 I.R.C. § 6050N(a).

32Treas. Reg. § 1.6050N-I(c)(2)(i) (as amendcd in 1999) (incorporating
the dcfinition of "payor" from Trcas. Rcg. § 1.6049-4(a) by rcfcrcncc).
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However, the rules regarding the reporting of dividend
payments cannot be read so charitably. Like the interest and
royalty reporting rules, § 6042 requires those who pay Si0 or
more in dividends as well as those who receive and disburse
payments of $10 or more of dividends as a nominee to file an
information return. 33 And, as was the case with § 6050N and in
contrast to § 6049, no mention is made of middlemen in the text
of § 6042. The regulations under § 6042 do seem to fill this gap
in the definition of "nominee":
For purposes of this section, a person who
receives a dividend shall be considered to have
received it as a nominee if he is not the actual
owner of such dividend and if he was required
under § 1.6109-1 to furnish his identifying
number to the payer of the dividend (or would
have been so required if the total of such
dividends for the year had been $10 or more),
and such number was (or would have been)
required to be included on an information
return filed
by the payer with respect to the
34
dividend.
This regulation goes on, however, to depart significantly from
the scope of the definition of "middleman" in the regulations
under § 6049 and, concomitantly, from the scope of nominee/
middleman reporting mandated by the general instructions for
Fonn 1099:
[A] person shall not be considered to be a
nominee as to any portion of a dividend which
is actually owned by another person whose
name is also shown on the information return
filed by the payer -or nominee with respect to
such dividend. Thus, in the case of stock
jointly owned by a husband and wife, the
husband will not be considered as receiving
any portion of a dividend on that stock as a
33I.R.C. § 6042(a).
14

Treas. Rcg. § 1.6042-2(a)(2) (as amcndcd in 2000).
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nominee for his wife if his wife's name is
included on the information return 35filed by the
payer with respect to the dividend.
Though this regulation uses a married couple to illustrate this
exception, the exception, by its own terms, applies to any joint
owners of stock whose names both appear on the Form 1099DIV issued by the payer of the dividend. 36 Yet, despite this
broadly worded exception in the regulations under § 6042, the
general instructions for Form 1099 do not appear to absolve the
recipient of a Form 1099-DIV from having to furnish a Form
1099 to a joint owner (with a copy to the IRS transmitted with
Form 1096), unless the stock happens to be jointly held by a
husband and wife.
The regulations under §§ 6042, 6049, and 6050N thus paint
a far less neat and coordinated picture than do the general
instructions for Form 1099. Through the general instructions for
Form 1099, the IRS has deliberately created a uniform rule for
nominee/middleman reporting where none exists in the
corresponding regulations. Simplification through harmonization
may be a laudable goal; however, one cannot help but observe
that the blanket exception for husbands and wives in the general
instructions for Form 1099 is completely unmoored from the
text of the statute. Sections 6042, 6049, and 6050N all speak
generally of nominees or middlemen-none of these sections
makes specific mention of spouses, married couples, husbands,
or wives.3 7 The relevant legislative history provides no support

35 Id.; see Rosenbaum v. Comm'r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3033 (1992)
(exception unavailable because wife's name was not included on Form 1099
provided to husband).
36 It is worth noting that this same exception existed under § 6049 prior to
the amendment of Treasury Regulations § 1.6049-4 in 1997. Compare T.D. 8734,
1997-2 C.B. 109 (amending Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(f)(4)(i)), with T.D. 7881,
1983-1 C.B. 316 (initially promulgating that same regulation). No reason was
given in the preamble to either the proposed or final regulations for this change.
See T.D. 8734, 1997-2 C.B. 109; Information Reporting and Backup
Withholding, 1988-1 C.B. 892 (proposed January 1988) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pts. 1,31, and 35a).

37 Cf I.R.C.

§§ 6042, 6049, 6050N.
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for an exception for spouses either. 38 Furthermore, as discussed
earlier, there is no obvious rationale for the IRS's unexplained
this exception to cover only different-sex
choice to narrow
39
married couples.
C. Endemic Privilegings
In the past, all of the relevant regulations had embraced the
dividend-reporting regulations' broad exception to information
reporting, which absolves the recipient of the Form 1099 from
reporting so long as the payer also identifies the other joint
owner(s) on that form. 40 Then, for no apparent reason and with
no explanation, 41 the federal government narrowed this
exception from information reporting for interest (and,
derivatively, royalty) payments so that it now covers only
married different-sex couples. It also issued instructions
explaining the relevant tax forms that disregard the relevant
regulations and narrow the exception from information reporting
for dividends so that it, too, covers only different-sex spouses.
No matter how inexplicable these changes may be, one thing can
be said of them-they did not come about by chance, but
through purposeful (though, it appears, not deliberate) action.
Without any publicly explained rationale for them, these changes
may seem unthinking; however, they bear the mark of having
been influenced by the endemic privileging of marriage. They
seem to serve no purpose other than to further entrench the

38 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 11-788 to -789 (1986)

(Conf. Rep.),

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4876-77; H.R. REP. No. 97-760, at 56263 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1190, 1334-35; H.R.
REP. No. 87-2508, at 41-42 (1962) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3732, 3762-63; S. REP. No. 87-1881, at 118-23 (1962), reprinted
in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3297, 3424-30.
39 See supra text accompanying note 26 as well as the remainder of that
paragraph.
40 See supra note 36.
41 Neither the preamble to the proposed nor the final regulations discusses
the reason for this change. See supra note 36.
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privileged position that marriage occupies in our federal tax
42
laws.
To understand this point, let us first consider the effects of,
and then a readily available alternative to, the general
instructions' nominee/middleman reporting rules. If taxpayers
are aware of these rules, they find themselves saddled with
onerous compliance and recordkeeping burdens, not to mention
potential penalties if they happen to learn of the rules too late in
the filing season.4 3 And if the initial payer included the names of
all of the joint owners on the initial Form 1099, these burdens
will have been imposed for naught-the information reported by
the taxpayer on the additional Form 1099 will merely duplicate
information that the IRS already has-and the IRS will find
itself bombarded with more information than it should
reasonably have to process. But if the misinformation circulating
on the Internet about reporting interest from joint bank accounts
is any indication, 44 taxpayers are more likely to be unaware of
these rules. In that case, they will either overpay their taxesthat is, if the first joint owner reports and pays tax on all of the
interest income, even the portion that belongs to the second joint
owner 4 5 -or risk an audit because the income reported on their
tax returns does not match the information reported to the IRS
on Form 1099.
42 See supra note 7 and infra

note 305 and accompanying text.

43 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.

14See If a Bank Account Is Owned by 2 Unmarried Adults, How Does the
IRS Decide Who Pays Taxes on Interest Incomne?, YAHOO! ANSWERS, http://
answcrs.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071216053619AA3r125 (last visited
Sept. 30, 2011).
15
Correlatively, the second joint owner's taxable income will be
underreported by a like amount. If the first joint owner's overpayment of taxes
were somehow characterized as a payment of taxes on behalf of the second joint
owner, this overpayment would itself have independent tax consequences. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 2511(a) (LEXIS through July 2010 amendments) (the gift tax
applies to indirect transfers of property by gift); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729-30 (1929) (payment of another's taxes constitutes
additional income to the person whose taxes were paid, to be characterized based
on the circumstances surrounding the payment); Rev. Rul. 81-I10, 198 I-I C.B.
479 ("The gratuitous payment of an individual's indebtedness is a gift to the
individual rather than a gift to the individual's creditor.").
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A more efficient alternative to the potentially costly and
burdensome approach of the general instructions would be to
apply a modified version of the broad exception that ostensibly
exists in the dividend-reporting rules to all joint owners and
absolve them from filing Forms 1099 and 1096 without regard to
their marital status or relationship to each other. To ensure
compliance in the reporting of interest, dividend, and royalty
income, the IRS could require (rather than merely permit) the
payer to include (1) each owner's name and taxpayer
identification number on the Form 1099 and (2) each owner's
ownership percentage (as reported to the payer at the time the
account was opened or the property was purchased or licensed).
Remarkably, in lieu of embracing such a simple and
straightforward rule, which is both more efficient and more
46
neutral with regard to the formation of personal relationships,
the IRS has opted for a rule that singles out "traditional"
marriage for special treatment and, as explained below,
exacerbates subordination along lines of class, race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, and marital status.
Most obviously, the general instructions' spousal exception
from iominee/middleman reporting contributes to the bizarre
web of incentives and disincentives that can influence differentsex couples when they decide whether to marry, whether to have
the secondary earner in the couple enter the workforce, and
whether to have the secondary earner work part or full time.
Professor Edward McCaffery identifies five principal factors in
the tax laws that influence these decisions:
(1) the aggregation of spousal tax rates under
the income tax [i.e., the "marriage penalty"];
(2) the disaggregation of spousal rates, with an
asymmetric allocation of benefits, tinder the
social security system; (3) the failure to tax
imputed income from self-supplied labor; (4)
the present treatment of mixed business46 See generally.Anthony C. Infanti, DecentralizingFamily: An hiclusive

Proposalfor Individual Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 605
(advocating the abolition of the joint federal income tax return in favor of an
individual filing regime that would recognize all of a taxpayer's interdependent
economic relationships and not only those patterned after the so-called

traditional family with the different-sex married couple at its core).
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personal expenses, particularly child care; and
(5) the treatment of fringe benefits.47
Of course, the nominee/middleman reporting rules play only a
supporting role in creating this web of incentives and
disincentives. Nevertheless, being spared an informationreporting burden that constitutes little more than a trap for the
unwary either adds to the benefits or reduces the detriments of
marriage from a tax perspective.
Professor McCaffery explains that this complex web of
incentives and disincentives has a disproportionately negative
impact on women as well as effects that vary along class lines:
Perhaps even more importantly, the situation
of upper-income families-indeed, the whole
range of treatment by class-introduces highly
unfortunate discontinuities. Among the lower
classes, the tax laws discourage formal family
structures. This might retard economic
improvement to the middle class. At the
middle income levels, the laws encourage
women to work full time or stay at home.
Either such women fail to develop valuable
job market skills, or they find themselves
pushing against the upper income levels. But
as soon as they do, they face even greater
incentives to stay home. Secondary earners in
general, and married mothers in particular, are
thus pushed in different directions as they
cross income levels. The whole pattern is
reflected in a social structure that finds poor
women alone, middle class women in 48a bind,
and upper class women disempowered.
There is also a racial dimension to the web of tax incentives and
disincentives associated with the privileging of marriage in our
tax laws. Professor Dorothy Brown has explained that Professor

47 See McCaffery, supra note 6, at 988.

48 Id. at 1029.
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McCaffery's analysis may be more relevant to white differentsex couples than it is to African-American different-sex couples.
She points out that the African-American experience might
differ because African-American different-sex couples are (1)
more likely than white couples to experience a marriage penalty
(and a resulting disincentive to marry) because their incomes are
more likely to be equal and (2) more likely to have the man
49
(rather than the woman) be the secondary earner in the couple.
Mylinh Uy has expanded on Professor Brown's analysis by
explaining how the experience of Asian-American different-sex
couples may be closer to that of African-American different-sex
couples than to it is to white different-sex couples.5 0
From the perspective of same-sex couples, the nominee/
middleman reporting rules are simply another facet of the overt
and covert discrimination that is perpetrated against them
throughout the Code. 5 ' Because the federal Defense of Marriage
Act requires
the IRS to treat all same-sex couples as tax
"singles, ' 52 same-sex couples are ineligible for the spousal
exception from nominee/middleman reporting-even if they are
treated as married (and, therefore, as spouses) under the laws of
their state of residence. From a marital status perspective,
individuals who are uncoupled (and, therefore, truly single)whether they happen to be gay or straight, living alone or acting
as head of a household-find themselves in this same

49Brown, supra note 6, at 791-97.

50Uy, supra note 6, at 138.
5! See Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System:

Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX
LAW. 407, 423-36 (2008) (describing the overt and covert discrimination against
same-sex couples in the tax laws); see also supra note 7.
52 I U.S.C. § 7 (LEXIS through July 2010 amendments). See iufra note
118 for discussion of a recent federal district court decision finding this portion
of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional as it applies to several
Massachusetts same-sex couples as well as President Obama's recent decision to
cease defending the Defense of Marriage Act in court.
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predicament if they 53share ownership of income-producing
property with another.
To round out these many intersections, consider that, even
though information reporting is a relatively effective means of
ensuring compliance, a withholding tax on investment income
would be an even more effective compliance tool. 54 Despite
other countries' successful imposition of withholding taxes on
investment income, 55 for more than sixty years the financial
services industry has managed to foil repeated attempts to
impose a withholding tax on investment income in the United
States. 56 Professor Lily Kahng asserts that the federal
government's use of a more stringent tax enforcement measure
(i.e., a withholding tax) against those with income from wages
and a less stringent enforcement -measure (i.e., information
reporting) against those with investment income is inherently
preferences accorded to investment
unfair and magnifies the
57
income under the Code.
This inequality in enforcement has a clear impact along
class lines. For taxable years 2007 and 2008, approximately 97%
of all returns filed by individuals reported an adjusted gross
income of less than $200,000. 58 In both years, these returns

13 See generally Kahng, Loneliest Number, supra note 6 (describing the
predicament of single taxpayers).
54 See Charles P. Rettig, Nonfilers Beware: Who s That Knocking at Your
Door?, J. TAX PRAC. PROC., Oct.-Nov. 2006, at 15, 15 (indicating that thc rate
of misreporting for amounts subject to withholding is only 1.2% while the rate of
misreporting for amounts subject only to third-party information reporting is
4.5%).

55Kahng, Investment Income Withholding, supra note 13, at 324.
56 Id. at 324-27.

57Id. at 338-39.
58 I.R.S. PUB. No. 1304, supra note 27, at 16 tbl.B; Justin Bryan,
hidividual Income Tax Returns, 2007, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2009, at 5, 22
tblI.
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reported 80% of total salaries and wages. 59 The remaining 3% of
returns-for individuals with adjusted gross incomes of at least
S200,000-reported the other 20% of total salaries and wages
but a far higher share of total taxable interest (47% in 2007 and
42% in 2008), total tax-exempt interest (66% in 2007 and 57%
in 2008), total ordinary dividends (60% in 2007 and 57% in
2008), total qualified dividends (65% in 2007 and 61% in 2008),6
and total net royalty income (62% in 2007 and 66% in 2008). 0
Thus, the privileging of so-called traditional marriage in the
information-reporting rules is built upon the foundation of a
class-based privileging that imposes a less effective and less
intrusive method of enforcement on items of income that are
disproportionately associated with the wealthiest of taxpayers.
This class-based privileging can have its own disparate impacts
along lines of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and
marital status due to, among other things, wage discrimination

59I.R.S. PUtB. No. 1304, supra note 27, at 42 tbl. 1.4; Bryan, supra note 58,
at 22 tbl. I.
60 I.R.S. PUB. No. 1304, supra note 27, at 42 tbl. 1.4; Bryan, supra note 58,
at 22 ibi. 1. Notably, from 2007 to 2008, the amounts reported in most of these
categories of income decreased, in some cases significantly. I.R.S. PUB. No.
1304, supra note 27, at 2 tbl.A.

It is also worth noting that these figures are consistent with data reported
in the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances. In the report for
2007, 84.8% of the families in the top decile of income were savers, while only
56.5% of families overall saved. Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Fanily
Finances fivom 2004 to 2007: Evidence fiv'n the Survey of Consumer Finances,
FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2009, at Al, A5 tbl. I. Moreover, 7.8% of the income of
families in the top decile came from interest and dividends, compared with 1.9%
for families in the 75-89.9 percentile of income and no more than 0.7% for
contrast, wages comprised
families below that income level. /i. at A7 tbl.2. In
h
nearly 80% of the income of families below the 751 percentile, but only 46% of
the income of families in the top decile. Id.
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on these bases that detrimentally affects the ability to accumulate
wealth. 6

In the next two parts of this Article, the complex,
intertwined endemic privilegings along multiple axes of
subordination that we have uncovered in the information61 MELVIN D. OLIVER

THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE

WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 73 (1995) ("Theories of

wealth accumulation and inequality specify earning power as the best predictor
of wealth. An examination of wealth holding by income class provides a clear
picture of the strong relationship between income inequality and wealth
inequality."); see id. passim. (exploring the nature and causes of the significant
wealth gap between African Americans and whites and explaining that income
alone does not fully account for this gap); Carmen Diana Decre Cheryl R. Doss,
The Gender Asset Gap: What Do We Know and Wily Does It Matter?, 12 FEM.
ECON. I, 11(2006) ("[l]n both datasets the median and mean [nonpension] assets
of married couples are substantially greater than those of single household
heads . . . . a difference greater than that accounted for by the simple fact that
married couples have two adults who may contribute to wealth .... "); id. at 35
("The evidence provided above demonstrates that women systematically have
less access to wealth."); Infanti, supra note 15, at 1227-39 (citing and discussing
a number of studies on wage discrimination experienced by traditionally
subordinated groups, but explaining that income is, at best, an incomplete proxy
for discrimination and, at worst, a highly misleading one); Sunhwa Lee, Racial
and Ethnic Differences in Women s Retirement Security, 30 J. WOMEN, POL.
POL'Y 141, 148-49 (2009) (summarizing research on wealth inequality based on
race and ethnicity); id. at 158-64 (exploring the sources of women's retirement
income based on race, ethnicity, marital status, and living arrangements and,
echoing the findings of research regarding wealth inequality, showing that
minority women are far less likely than white women to have income from
assets); Angcla Lyons ct al., Gender and Marital Differences in Wealth and
Investment Decisions, 6 J. PERS. FIN. 57, 57-58 (2008) (indicating that women's
wealth has historically been lower than men's wealth and that this continues to
be the case today; in addition, the wealth of singles is lower than that of married
couples, even after controlling for the presence of two earners in a married
couple); Urvi Neelakantan Yunhee Chang, Gender Differences in Wealth at
Retirement, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 362 (2010) (exploring whether gender
differences in risk preferences can explain the gender-based wealth gap at
retirement and concluding that, though there is a negative correlation between
risk aversion and wealth accumulation, the correlation is not strong enough to
explain the gap); Lucie Schmidt Purvi Sevak, Gender, Marriage, and Asset
Accumulation in the United States, 12 FEM. ECON. 139, 156 (2006) (finding that,
"even after controlling for differences in observable characteristics, including
earnings, there arc large wealth gaps by gender and marital status throughout the
wealth distribution," but noting that these wealth gaps disappear in the younger
cohort of households headed by those between twenty-five and thirty-nine years
old-whether because this group is fundamentally different from the older
generations, the wealth gap does not emerge until later in life, or some other
reason).
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reporting rules will become even further reified. First, we will
consider the identification and documentation requirements in
the deductions, exclusions, and credits that provide (or deny) tax
benefits based on family status. Then, we will consider the
dearth of identification and documentation requirements in the
rules that attribute property ownership from one family member
to another. When taken together, these rules will highlight other
ways in which endemic privilegings permeate the administrative
structure underpinning the family tax provisions in the Code.
11.

Deductions, Credits, and Exclusions

A number of income tax provisions afford (or, conversely,
deny) taxpayers benefits with respect to their family members.
Many of the benefits take the form of a deduction or credit for
income transferred to, or on behalf of, a family member. (Or, in
the case of benefits denied with respect to family members, take
the form of a deduction or credit for income transferred to, or on
behalf of, an unrelated individual.) In other cases, a taxpayer can
exclude the value of a benefit provided by her employer directly
to a family member or can exclude other income that is used for
the family member's benefit. To obtain the deduction, credit, or
exclusion, the taxpayer is usually required-either explicitly or
implicitly-to comply with identification or documentation
requirements. For instance, in the case of family-based tax
benefits, the taxpayer may be required to specifically identify the
family member, provide the family member's taxpayer
identification number, and/or describe her relationship with the
family member as a prerequisite to claiming the benefit.
The baseline with respect to these deductions, credits, and
exclusions is thus the same as that encountered in the
information-reporting rules discussed in Part 1, namely one of
identification and documentation. The discussion in this Part of
the baseline of identification and documentation is divided into
two sections. The first section addresses the baseline of
identification and documentation of relatives and other family
members. The second section addresses the baseline of
identification and documentation of spouses and former spouses.
A. Documenting Relatives and Other Family Members
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1.

Dependents
Exemption

and the Additional Personal

Perhaps the most far-reaching of the Code's requirements
that a taxpayer identify and document her family members was
enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In that Act,
Congress established the requirement that a taxpayer must
furnish each dependent's taxpayer identification number in order
to be entitled to claim a deduction for an additional personal
exemption with respect to the dependent. 62 For this purpose, a
"dependent" is currently defined to include certain of the
taxpayer's children (including stepchildren, adopted children,
and certain foster children) and their descendants, certain
relatives (including in-laws, stepparents, and stepsiblings), and
certain other household members who are neither related nor
married to the taxpayer. 63 Initially, the documentation
64
requirement only applied to dependents five years and older.
Congress gradually lowered this age limit and then eliminated it
in 1994.65 At present, a taxpayer is asked on the Form 1040 to
identify each dependent by name, to supply each dependent's
Social Security number, and to identify the relationship between
66
her and the dependent.
This requirement to identify and document dependents was
intended to curb potential tax abuses:
62 I.R.C. § 151 (c) (LEXIS through July 2010 amendments).

63Id. § 152(c)(2), (d)(2), (f0().
64

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1524(a), 100 Stai. 2085,

2749 (codified at I.R.C. § 6109(c)).
65 Uruguay Round Agrecments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 742(b), 108
(amending I.R.C. § 6109(c) to climinatc the age
threshold); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10 1-508, §
11112, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-413 (amending I.R.C. § 6109(e) to lower the age
threshold from two years of age to one); Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-485, § 704, 102 Stat. 2343, 2427 (amending I.R.C. § 6109(e) to lower
the age threshold from five to two years of age); see also Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1615(a), I10 Stat. 1755, 1853
Stat. 4809, 5010 (1994)

(moving the identification and documentation requirement from I.R.C. § 6109(c)

to its current location in I.R.C. § 15 1(e)).
66

FORM 1040, supra note 26, at I 1.6(c).
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Congress believed that it is important to ensure
the validity of claims for dependents on tax
returns. Some taxpayers claim dependents that
the taxpayers are not entitled to claim. For
example, following a divorce, both parents
may continue to claim the children as
dependents, even though only one of the
parents is legally entitled to claim the children
as dependents.
Congress chose to increase compliance in this
area by requiring that a taxpayer include on
the taxpayer's tax return the taxpayer
identification number (TIN) of any dependent
claimed on7 that tax return who is at least 5
6
years old.
This documentation requirement decreased the number of false
and erroneous claims for additional personal exemptions with
respect to dependents. When eliminating the age threshold that
had applied to the documentation requirement, Congress noted
that "[t]he requirement that TINs be provided with respect to
each dependent claimed on a tax return has significantly reduced
the improper claiming of dependents. Requiring that TINs be
supplied regardless of the age of the dependent will further
reduce the improper claiming of dependents." 68
Indeed, "[a]fter Congress enacted the requirement that
dependents' Social Security numbers must be entered on a tax
return, a couple of million dependents disappeared." 69 This is not
an exaggeration. For taxable year 1986, individual taxpayers
claimed more than 77 million exemptions for dependents. 70 For
67 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, JCS-10-87, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1286-87 (1987); see 132 CONG. REC.
(daily ed. June 19, 1986).

S7893-98

68H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt. I (1994), at *172 (Wcstlaw).
69George Guttman, Improper Refunds Sapping Billions, 65 TAX NOTES 19

(1994).
70 I.R.S. PUB. No. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 1986, at 68

tbl.2.3, col. 15 (1989).
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taxable year 1987, the first year in which the new identification
71
and documentation requirement was in effect,

individual

taxpayers claimed 71.8 million-that is, more than 5 million
fewer-exemptions for dependents. 72 Furthermore, in the eyes of
the Tax Court, the reduction in improper claims of additional
personal exemptions for dependents constituted a compelling
government interest that justified the rejection of a taxpayer's
First Amendment challenge to the identification and
requirement, which is currently codified at §
documentation
73
15 1(e).
2.

Overlap with Other Tax Deductions and Credits
for Dependents

Technically, this identification and documentation
requirement applies only for purposes of claiming the additional
personal exemption for a dependent. In practice, however, it is
not nearly so constrained. The requirement's reach is far broader
because the group of "dependents" with respect to whom a
personal exemption can be claimed under § 151 largely overlaps
-and,
in some cases, is coextensive with-the group of
"dependents" who give rise to (or are denied) tax benefits under
other deduction and credit provisions in the Code. 74 In effect,
§ 151(e) establishes a baseline of identification and
documentation of family members for all of these provisions by
imposing a de facto identification and documentation
requirement with respect to many, if not all, tax dependents.
Among the provisions that allow a deduction for expenses
incurred with respect to a taxpayer's dependents are § 162
(health insurance coverage for self-employed individuals), § 213
(medical care), § 217 (moving expenses), § 220 (Archer medical

71Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1524(c), 100 Stat. 2085,
2749.
72 I.R.S. PUB. No. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 1987, at 53
tbl.2.3, col. 5 (1990).

73Miller v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 511 (2000).
74 Section 151 incorporates by reference the definition of "dependent"
found in § 152. I.R.C. § 151(c) (LEXIS through July 2010 amendments).
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savings accounts), § 221 (educational loan interest), § 222
(qualified tuition and related expenses), and § 223 (health
savings accounts). 75 Among the provisions that allow a credit for
expenses incurred with respect to a taxpayer's dependents are §
21 (dependent care credit), § 24 (child tax credit), § 25A
(American opportunity, hope, and lifetime learning credits), § 32
(earned income credit), and § 35 (health insurance credit). 76 As
mentioned above, the overlap between the "dependents" covered
by these deduction and credit provisions and the identification
and documentation requirement imposed for purposes of the
personal exemption varies.
These variations create the potential for gaps in coverage
of the de facto identification and documentation requirement
imposed by § 151(e). As we will see, these gaps are sometimes
filled, at other times left unfilled, and at yet other times are
overfilled. Far from negating the existence of a baseline of
identification and documentation, these gaps highlight the
existence of that baseline-after all, these gaps are identifiable
.only when a tax deduction or credit provision is compared to the
baseline established in § 15 1(e). Legislative and administrative
reaction (or, in many cases, failure to react) to these gapsespecially when taken together with the unexplained spousal
exemption to the information-reporting rules described in Part I
above-lends the administrative structure underpinning the
family tax provisions a haphazard and uncoordinated feel. As we
will further explore in Part III below, congressional and
administrative heedlessness only provides further support for the
notion that endemic privilegings along multiple axes of
subordination-including class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation, and marital status-have subtly influenced decisions
to include or omit identification and documentation
requirements in connection with enforcement of the family tax
provisions.
a.

Examples of Overlaps in Coverage

75 I(. §§ 162(), 213(a), 217(b)(2), (g), 220(d)(2)(A), 221(d), 222(d)(I),
223(d)(2)(A).
76

Id. §§ 21(b)(I), 24(c), 25A(t)(l), 32(c)(I)(A), (c)(3), 35(a), (d).
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Now let us turn to some concrete examples that illustrate
these overlaps and gaps in coverage of the de facto
documentation requirement imposed by § 15 1(e). The American
opportunity, hope, and lifetime learning credits and the tuition
deduction use precisely the Same definition of "dependent" as
§ 151, which means that any dependent whose expenses are
creditable or deductible under these provisions is subject to the
77
identification and documentation requirement in § 151(e).
Taxpayers are unlikely to claim the benefit of these educational
incentives but fail to claim the additional personal exemption.
The personal exemption is the most salient of all the benefits
associated with dependents, as the number of a taxpayer's
exemptions is determined on line 6 of the Form 1040immediately after checking one's filing status and before
entering the first item of income on the retum. 78 In fact, the
instructions to the Form 1040 admonish taxpayers that:
You must enter each dependent's social
security number (SSN). Be sure the name and
SSN entered agree with the dependent's social
security card. Otherwise, at the time we
process your return, we may disallow the
exemption claimed for the dependent and
reduce or disallow any other tax benefits (such
as the child tax credit) based on that
79
dependent.
Furthermore, Form 8863, which is used to claim the American
opportunity, hope, and lifetime learning credits, and Form 8917,
which is used to claim the tuition deduction, require the taxpayer
to list the name and taxpayer identification number of the
student with respect to whom the credit is claimed-and the

71 Id. §§

25A(f)(l)(A)(iii)

(defining "qualified tuition and related

expenses" as including those of a dependent, but only if an additional personal
exemption can be claimed under § 151 with respect to the dependent), 222(d)(1)
(incorporating by reference the definition of "qualified tuition and related
expenses" found in § 25A(f)).
78FORM 1040, supra note 26, at I I. 6(c).
79 I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM1040, at 19-20 (2009) [hereinafter
FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS] (emphasis added).
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form specifically asks for the name and identification number
"as shown on page Iof your tax return." 80
In other cases, the definition of "dependent" employed for
purposes of § 151 overlaps, but is not coextensive with, the
definition of "dependent" used in other deduction and credit
provisions in the Code. For example, § 213 allows a deduction
for medical expenses incurred with respect to a taxpayer's
"dependents." Though the group of dependents covered by § 213
includes those for whom a personal exemption can be claimed, it
is expanded by statute to encompass certain individuals who fail
to meet selected elements of the basic definition of
"dependent" (viz., the cap on gross income and the no joint
return requirement). 8' This leaves a gap in identification and
documentation of dependents because § 213 does not require the
taxpayer to identify and document dependents with respect to
whom a deduction is taken but to whom § 151(e) does not
apply. 82 This underdocumentation of dependents opens the door
to potential taxpayer error and abuse of the medical expense
deduction because the only check on the propriety of a claimed
deduction will come in the highly unlikely event that the IRS
audits the taxpayer.83
In contrast, § 24 employs a more limited definition of
dependent for purposes of the child tax credit. It lowers the age
cap by allowing the child tax credit to be taken only with respect
to a qualifying child under the age of seventeen, and it disallows
the credit with respect to qualifying noncitizen children who are
residents of Canada and Mexico. 84 Accordingly, even though all
8o I.R.S. FORM 8863: EDUCATION CREDITS (AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY,
HOPE, AND LIFETIME LEARNING CREDITS), at I pt. I, I. I(a)-(b) (2009); id. at pt.
11,I. 3(a)-(b); id. at pt. 11, I. 5(a)-(b); I.R.S. FORM 8917: TUITION AND FEES
DEDUCTION, at 1 I. I (a)-(b) (2009).

"' I.R.C. § 213(a) (incorporating the definition of"dcpcndcnt" in § 152,
but without regard to paragraphs (b)(I), (b)(2), and (d)(I)(B) of that section).
82 See FORM 1040, supra note 26, at I 1.29 (no rcporting requirements

mentioned); FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 79, at 30-31 (same).
'3 See infra note 134.

84I.R.C. § 24(a), (c).
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dependents covered by § 24 are also covered by the
identification and documentation requirement of § 151 (e), not all
dependents identified on the taxpayer's return as eligible for an
additional personal exemption will support a claim for the child
tax credit. This creates a potential gap in the opposite direction
of § 213; that is, it gives rise to the possibility of misleading
overdocumentation. This opens the door to potential errors and
abuse in claims for the child tax credit. A taxpayer who does not
85
carefully walk through the instructions in three different places
might mistakenly believe or assume that a child properly
documented for purposes of claiming the additional personal
exemption also qualifies for the child tax credit. Again, the only
check on the propriety of a claimed deduction will come in the
86
highly unlikely event that the IRS audits the taxpayer.
b. Gaps Filled, Unfilled, and Overfilled
This potential for under- and overdocumentation of
dependents highlights the need for specific corrective measures
that deter false or erroneous claims by taxpayers and foster
compliance with the terms of the relevant Code provisions. Yet,
a review of these provisions reveals a haphazard, uncoordinated
approach to filling these potential gaps. On one hand, the
independent identification and documentation requirements in
the dependent care credit and the earned income credit ensure
that the use of a concomitantly narrower and broader definition
of "dependent" in these provisions will not give rise to either an
under- or overdocumentation problem. 87 In addition, the IRS has
itself taken steps to cure the possibility of overdocumentation
with regard to the child tax credit by requiring taxpayers to
check a box next to those dependents for whom the taxpayer
may claim an additional personal exemption and who render the
taxpayer eligible to claim the child tax credit. 88 On the other
hand, § 24 contains an independent documentation requirement
-even
though that requirement is duplicative of the
85FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 79, at 17, 42-44, 72.
86See infra note 134.

87I.R.C. §§ 21(e)(10), 32(c)(3)(D).
88FORM 1040, supra note 26, at I 1.6(c)(4).
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documentation requirement in § 151(e), which applies to each
and every dependent for whom a child tax credit may be
claimed. 89 The same is true of the American opportunity, hope,
and lifetime learning credits and the tuition deduction, which, as
described above, employ definitions of "dependent" that are
coextensive with that employed by § 151(e), yet contain their
own independent documentation requirements. 9" The other
deduction and credit provisions employ definitions of
"dependent" that depart from that employed in § 151, thereby
creating potential gaps in the coverage of its de facto
documentation requirement; however, none of those provisions
contains an independent documentation requirement that would
fill that gap. 9'
3.

Overlap with Exclusions Relating to Dependents
a.

Fringe Benefits

These same variations and gaps are found in Code
provisions that afford exclusions from gross income. The Code
provisions that allow a taxpayer to exclude from gross income
fringe benefits provided to family members by an employer
include § 101 (survivor benefits provided to family members of
a public safety officer killed in the line of duty), §§ 105 and 106
(employer-provided medical care), § 117 (tuition benefits
provided to the family members of an employee of an
educational organization), § 119 (employer-provided meals and
lodging), § 129 (employer-provided dependent care assistance
programs), § 132 (no-additional-cost services, qualified
employee discounts, and qualified moving expense

89 I.R.C. § 24(c).

90 h. §§ 25A(g)(I), 222(d)(2); see supra note 80.
91 For a complete listing of the provisions discussed in this section with an
indication of (I) whether they employ a definition of "dependent" that differs
from that employed in § 151 and (2) whether they contain independent
documentation requirements, see infra Table I following Part II.A.4.
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reimbursements), and § 134 (military benefits). 92 With the
exception of §§ 119 and 134, which adopt definitions of
"dependent" that are coextensive with that employed by § 151,
there are gaps between the coverage of these exclusions and the
identification and documentation requirement of § 151(e).
Interestingly, however, recordkeeping requirements that apply to
employers fill in all of these gaps in coverage and ensure the
identification and documentation of all dependents eligible for
these exclusions, regardless of whether the taxpayer can claim
them as dependents for purposes of the personal exemption.
Employers who are required to deduct and withhold
income tax from the wages of their employees must keep records
regarding (1) the total remuneration paid to each employee and
(2) the portion of this remuneration that constitutes wages
subject to withholding. 93 Employers are further required to keep
records regarding the reasons for any discrepancy between these
two amounts. 94 In other words, it is up to the taxpayer's
employer to ask the taxpayer/employee to document her claim
for an exclusion from gross income (and, in turn, exemption
from withholding 95) and to retain the records supporting that
claim. Through these recordkeeping requirements, the federal
government has gone far beyond merely establishing a baseline
of identification and documentation. By filling in all of the gaps
in the de facto documentation requirement of § 151(e) as it
applies to these exclusions, the federal government has

92 I.R.C. §§ 101(h), 105(b), 117(d), 119(a), 120, 129, 132(a)(I), (a)(2),

(a)(6), (b), (c), (g), (h)(2H3), 134; Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1960); see also Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1, 2007-2 C.B. 714; I.R.S. Notice 2010-38, 2010-20 I.R.B.
1; I.R.S. Notice 2004-79, 2004-49 I.R.B. 898.

93Treas. Reg. § 31.6001-5(a)(2), (3) (as amended in 1983).
94

1. § 31.6001-5(a)(5).

95 See 1.R.C. § 3401(a)(18)-(22) (excluding amounts falling within the
exclusions under §§ 105, 106, 129, 132, and 134 from the definition of "wages"
for withholding tax purposes); Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-I(b)(9) (as amended in
2006) (excluding amounts falling within the exclusion under § 119 from the
definition of"wages" for withholding tax purposes).
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mandated identification and documentation as a prerequisite to
96
obtaining tax-free fringe benefits for a taxpayer's dependents.
b. Other Exclusions
A few exclusions do not involve employer-provided
benefits. For example, § 135 permits a taxpayer to exclude from
gross income interest on U.S. savings bonds used to pay the
higher education expenses of a dependent. 97 Even though this
exclusion is restricted to dependents for whom a personal
exemption may be claimed under § 151, the IRS nonetheless
requires the taxpayer to identify the dependent whose
expenses were paid with the redeemed U.S. savings
educational
98
bond.
Sections 529 and 530 provide additional incentives for
education by according favorable tax treatment to qualified
tuition programs (QTPs) and Coverdell educational savings
accounts (Coverdell ESAs). Both QTPs and Coverdell ESAs
benefit from tax-free growth of amounts contributed or saved
(i.e., the earnings on contributions to the account are excluded
from the gross income of the contributor and the beneficiary),
and distributions from these accounts to designated beneficiaries
are tax free so long as they do not exceed the beneficiary's
96 The federal government has concomitantly shifted the responsibility for
making initial assessments of eligibility for these exclusions to the taxpayer's
employer. This same shift in the responsibility for policing compliance extends
to taxable entertainment provided as a fringe benefit of an employment or
independent contractor relationship. Fringe benefits that are not otherwise
excluded from gross income are taxable to an employee or independent
contractor, even if the benefits are provided to another (e.g., a family member of
the employee). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(a)(4) (as amended in 1992). In the case of
taxable entertainment, the deduction for providing such entertainment is
conditioned on reporting the entertainment as income to the employee or
independent contractor-and, in the case of certain employees and independent
contractors, the amount of the deduction is limited to the amount reported as
income to the employee or independent contractor. I.R.C. § 274(c)(2), (9); Treas.
Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1996); see I.R.S. Notice 2005-45,
2005-24 I.R.B. 1228 (explaining the operation of the limitation of the deduction
to the amount reported as income to the employee or independent contractor).

97 I.R.C. § 135(c)(2)(A)(iii).
98 I.R.S. FORM 8815: EXCLUSION OF INTEREST FROM SERIES EE AND I U.S.

SAVINGS BONDS ISSUED AFTER 1989, at I1. 1(a) (2009).
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qualifying educational expenses. 99 A taxpayer who opens a
Coverdell ESA or an account with a QTP is permitted to change
the designated beneficiary to another member of the current
beneficiary's family without adverse tax consequences. 100
Apparently relying on the trustees of Coverdell ESAs and the
administrators of QTPs to police compliance with the
requirement that the new beneficiary be a member of the
existing beneficiary's family, little or no reporting of a change in
beneficiary is required. 101
In a different vein, § 139D allows taxpayers to exclude the
value of "qualified Indian health care benefits," including certain
health care benefits provided to the dependents of members of
an Indian tribe. This provision was enacted in March 2010 as
part of healthcare reform; it therefore remains to be seen whether
the IRS will issue any notices, forms, or regulations that require
identification or documentation of the taxpayer's dependents
who qualify for this exclusion but fall 02outside of the de facto
documentation requirement of § 151 (e). 1
With their mix of duplicative documentation requirements,
shifting of responsibility for policing compliance, and potential
for underdocumentation, these provisions share the haphazard
approach to identification and documentation of a taxpayer's
dependents encountered in the deduction and credit provisions
discussed in the previous two sections of this Part.
99

I.R.C. §§ 529(c)(1), (c)(3), 530(a), (d)(I)-(2).

100Id. §§ 529(c)(3)(C), 530(d)(5)-(6). In the case of a Coverdell ESA, the
member of the family must be under age 30, unless the member of the family
qualifies as a special needs beneficiary. Id. § 530(b)(1) (flush language), (d)(5)-

(6).
101See I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-Q, at 1,2 (2009) (requiring
no reporting for a change in beneficiary, but requiring reporting of the amount of
a distribution in the case of a rollover to another program); I.R.S. PUB. No. 970,
TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION 60-61, 70 (2009) (in the case of both a Coverdell
ESA and a QTP, advising taxpayers not to report a qualifying rollover anywhere
on the Form 1040 because it is nontaxable and further advising that a change in
beneficiary to another member of the family has no income tax consequences at
all).
112 I.R.C. § 139D(c)(5); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 9021(a), 124 Stat. 119,873 (2010) (enacting I.R.C. § 139D).
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4.

Overlap with Tax Disallowances
Dependents

Relating to

In some cases, Code provisions disqualify- payments to
relatives from eligibility for a deduction or credit. For example,
payments to a taxpayer's dependents and children under the age
of nineteen are ineligible for the dependent care assistance credit
and are likewise ineligible for the exclusion for employerprovided dependent care assistance programs. 10 3 A taxpayer
claiming the dependent care assistance credit or the exclusion
for an employer-provided dependent care assistance program
must identify and document all persons who provide dependent
care services for which a credit or exclusion is claimed,
notwithstanding that those who are dependents would already
have been documented4 on the first page of the return, as
10
mandated by § 151(e).
Section 213(d)( 11)
renders amounts paid for long-term care
services provided by a relative ineligible for deduction as
medical expenses, unless the relative is a licensed professional.
For this purpose, a "relative" is defined as "an individual bearing
a relationship to the individual which is described in any of
subparagraphs (A) through (G) of section 152(d)(2)."' 1 5 In some
cases, these relatives will be claimed as dependents on the return
and in others they will not (e.g., because they fail to meet other
prongs of the definition of "dependent" for purposes of §§ 151
and 152). 106 Nevertheless, § 213 does not require taxpayers to
identify or document any of the individuals to whom payments
07
for long-term care services are made. 1
Under § 170(g), a taxpayer may take a charitable
contribution deduction for amounts paid to maintain an
103

I.R.C. §§ 21(c)(6), 129(c).

104 I.R.C. §§ 21(e)(9),
DEPENDENT CARE EXPENSES,

129(c)(9);

I.R.S. FORM 2441: CHILD AND

at I pt. 1 (2009).

105
I.R.C. § 213(d)(I 1)(B).
,Id.

§ 152(d)(I)(B)-(D).

107 I.R.S. FORM 1040, SCHEDULE A: ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS, at I 11. 1-4

(2009).
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individual in her home in connection with that individual's
participation in an educational program, so long as the individual
is neither a dependent nor a relative of the taxpayer. 10 8 For this
purpose, the definition of "dependent" is borrowed from § 152,
but it is broadened by statute to include individuals who fail to
meet selected elements of that definition (viz., the no joint return
requirement and the gross income cap). 0 9 Again, a "relative" is
defined as "an individual bearing a relationship to the individual
which is described in any of subparagraphs (A) through (G) of
section 152(d)(2)."'l10 Though taxpayers claiming a deduction
under § 170(g) are required to submit a significant amount of
information with their tax returns in support of the deduction, a
statement regarding the taxpayer's relationship to the student is
not required-nor, apparently, is even identification of the
student explicitly required so that the student's name might be
matched with the persons claimed as dependents on the front of
the taxpayer's return. II
Newly enacted § 45R permits certain small employers who
provide health insurance coverage to their employees to claim a
credit against their income tax.' 12 Certain owners of the
business, their family members, and some of their dependents
are not taken into account as employees in calculating the
amount of this credit." 3 Though the IRS has provided taxpayers
guidance on claiming the credit, it remains to be seen whether
the IRS will require identification or documentation of the
employer's relationship to employees with respect to whom the
credit is claimed.' 14
1081.R.C.

§ 170(g).

" d. § 170(g)(I).
0

IId. § 170(g)(3).

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-2(a)(4) (1972); I.R.S. PUB. No. 526, CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS 19-20 (2009).
112 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. II1-148, §

1421, 124 Stat. 119, 237 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 45R).
113I.R.C. § 45R(c)(1).
114I.R.S.

Notice 2010-44, 2010-22 I.R.B. 717.
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These provisions either overfill compliance gaps in the de
facto documentation requirement of § 151(e) or leave them
wholly unfilled, further contributing to the haphazard patchwork
of identification and docurnentation requirements that apply to a
taxpayer's dependents.
Before turning to a discussion of documenting spouses in
the next section, it is worth pausing for a moment to peruse a
tabular representation of the numerous provisions discussed so
far in this Part. Table I summarizes this discussion by first
listing each of the Code sections mentioned above. The next two
columns in the table indicate whether the definition of
"dependent" in those sections is the same as-or, conversely,
varies from-the definition of "dependent". employed for
purposes of the de facto documentation requirement in § 15 1(e).
The final two columns in the table note whether the provision
contains an independent documentation requirement that applies
either to the taxpayer or to a third party dealing with the
taxpayer, which either fills or overfills any gaps in coverage.
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and Underfilled in the

Table 1-Gaps Filled, Overfilled,
Documentation of Dependents
Code Provision

Definition of Definition of
'Dependent"'Dependent"
Varies from
Same as §
§ 151(e)
151(e)

Independent Independent
Documentation Documentation
Requirement Requirement
(Third Party)
(Taxpayer)

21 (dependent
care credit)
§24 (child tax
credit)

§ 25A
(American

opportunity,

/

/

hope, and
lifetime learning
Credits)
§ 32 (earned
income credit)
§35 (health
insurance
credit)
§ 45R (small
employer health
insurance
credit)
§ 101 (survivor
benefits)

/

V

§§ 105 and 106
(employer-

V

V

provided
medical care)
§ 117 (tuition
benefits)
§ 119 (employerprovided meals
and lodging)

_

_

_

_

/
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ode Provision

Definition of Definition of
'Dependent" 'Dependent"
Same as §
Varies from
151(e)
§ 151(e)

129 (employerprovided
dependent care
assistance
programs)

,

Independent
Documentation
Requirement
(Taxpayer)

Independent
Documentation
Requirement
(Third Party)

/

§ 132 (fringe
benefits)

VI

§ 134 (military
benefits)

§ 135 (interest
on U.S. savings
bonds)

139D (Indian
healthcare
benefits)

V

VI

,

§ 162 (health
insurance for
self-employed)

V/

§ 170 (charitabl
contributions)

V/
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Code Provision

Definition of
'Dependent"
Same as §
151(e)

Definition of
"Dependent"
Varies from
§ 151(e)

Independent
Documentation
Requirement
(Taxpayer)

Independent
Documentation
Requirement
(Third Party)

§ 213 (medical
care)

217 (moving
expenses)

§ 220 (Archer
medical savings
accounts)

,

§ 221
(educational
loan interest)

§ 222 (qualified
tuition and
related
expenses)

,

§ 223 (health
savings
accounts)

V

529 (qualified
tuition
programs)

./

§ 530 (Coverdell
educational
savings
accounts)

V

V
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Documenting Spouses

B.

3. Current Spouses
The Code provides married different-sex couples a choice
between filing one joint return or two separate returns. 115 If the
couple files a joint return, then each spouse's name and Social
Security number must be entered at the top of the return. 116 If the
spouses decide to file separate returns, they are required to
identify and document their relationship by furnishing each
other's names and Social Security numbers when they select
"married filing separately" as their filing status."7 Thus, a
taxpayer's marital relationship (at least as defined for federal tax

5

11 See I.R.C. § 6013.
1", FORM 1040, supra notc 26, at I.
117/d.

at 11.3.
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purposes)" 8 is always identified and documented on his or her
return.
Many, though not all, of the exclusions, deductions, and
credits that are provided (or denied) to a taxpayer with respect to
her dependents apply equally to the taxpayer's different-sex

118I.R.C. § 6013(d); see also id. § 7703 (containing rules for determining
marital status that apply to a number of Code provisions). Determining whether
taxpayers are "married" for federal tax purposes can itself be a difficult and
complex question.

The basic rule is that a couple is "married" for tax
purposes if it is married for state law purposes on
December 31 of that tax year. But a taxpayer may be
married, although his spouse is dead, and unmarried
although his spouse is alive. A married taxpayer is not
married in the year his marriage is annulled but may or
may not have been married in earlier years. A divorced
couple is still married if the divorce decree is interlocutory
and a separated couple is unmarried if"legally separated."
But some couples separated by a court are not "legally
separated" and are, therefore, married for income tax
purposes. Other couples who are not separated but who
have lived apart for the full year may be unmarried for
some purposes and married for others.
Toni Robinson Mary Moers Wenig, Marty in Haste, Repent at Tax Time:
Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 788-90 (1989)
(footnotes omitted).
Moreover, the federal government currently denies recognition to samesex marriages for federal tax purposes. I U.S.C. § 7 (LEXIS through July 2010
amendments). Because the parties to a same-sex marriage are excluded from the
federal tax law definition of "spouse," they cannot claim the family tax
deductions, credits, and exclusions described in the text above on the grounds of
their marital status. Instead, the only way that same-sex couples can qualify for
the application of these family tax provisions is for one same-sex spouse to
qualify as the dependent of the other same-sex spouse under the terms of the
relevant Code section. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-39-001 (June 13,
2003) (describing the treatment of same-sex domestic partners for purposes of
the employer-provided medical care exclusions in I.R.C. §§ 105 and 106).
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spouse. 119 Where these provisions do apply to different-sex
spouses, they raise issues similar to the potential duplication and
underdocumentation issues discussed above with respect to
dependents. That is, where the different-sex spouses file a joint
return, requiring further documentation of a spousal relationship
results in duplicative documentation because both spouses are

This constitutes blatant discrimination on the basis of sexual orientationdiscrimination that should, without question, be eradicated from our federal tax
laws. See generally Infanti, supra note 51; see also Infanti, supra note 46
(proposing an individual filing regime that would rectify this discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation). Indeed, a federal district court has found that I
U.S.C. § 7, insofar as it applies to the federal tax laws, violates the right to equal
protection of the laws of several married same-sex couples from Massachusetts.
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376, 383, 387-97 (D. Mass.
2010). However, because this was not a facial challenge to the statute, it is
unclear what the precise impact of this decision will be; in any event, the federal
government has appealed this decision. Denise Lavoie, US Appeals Mass.
Rulings on Gay Marriage, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 13, 2010, at 7. Should the decision
in Gill be upheld on appeal, its ultimate impact might turn, in part, on a separate
federal district court decision that held California's Proposition 8, which
prohibits same-sex couples from marrying in that state, unconstitutional as a
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-1004 (N.D.
Cal. 2010). The decision in Perry holds the promise of extending the right to
marriage to same-sex couples across the country; however, the court's decision
in Perry was appealed on the same day that it was issued. Gay Marriage Appeal
Filed, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 6, 2010, at A5.
President Obama's recent decision to cease defending the Defense of
Marriage Act in court is another step in the right direction. See Charlie Savage
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at Al. It is far from clear, however, what the
practical, legal effect of this order will be, especially given that the executive
branch is nonetheless to continue enforcing the federal prohibition against
recognizing same-sex marriages. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att'y Gen.,
to John A. Bochncr, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23,
2011), available at http://www.scribd.coni/doc/49404879/Attorney-GencralHolder-s-Letter-to-John-Boehner-on-DOMA-Appeal. If anything, this move has
only further muddied the waters surrounding the application of the federal tax
laws to same-sex couples. Anthony C. Infanti, Questions Raised by Obama Shift
on DOMA, FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS (Feb. 23, 2011), http://
www.feministlawprofcssors.com/2011/02/follow-obama-shifl-doma/.
119Technically, spouses cannot qualify as dependents. I.R.C. § 152(c)(2)(3), (d)(2). Accordingly, spouses must be separately enumerated if they are to be
included within the ambit of these provisions.
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parties to, and already identified on, the return.120 Conversely,
where different-sex spouses file separate returns, failure to
require them to identify when they are claiming a tax allowance
with respect to each other creates the possibility that the same
tax benefit might be claimed by the spouses twice (i.e., once on
each return). 121 Yet, it is worth noting once again that these
issues of under- and overdocumentation exist only because there
is a baseline of identification and documentation of a spousal
relationship on all tax returns.
4. Former Spouses
A unique aspect of the spousal relationship is the ability to
sever that relationship and become former family members.
Disentangling the ties between spouses often involves the
payment of alimony and/or property settlements. Naturally, these
payments have tax consequences and raise issues regarding the
need to identify and document the former spousal relationship
between the parties.
If former different-sex spouses so elect, alimony payments
are deductible by the payer spouse and includible in the gross
income of the payee spouse. 122 In effect, this regime permits the
former spouses to extend the income-splitting privilege afforded
to different-sex married couples under the joint, return beyond
the end of the marital relationship. 123 Under § 215(c), a taxpayer
may deduct alimony paid to a former spouse only if she provides

120See supra

note 90 and accompanying text.

'21 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 213(a) (permitting a taxpayer to deduct medical

expenses paid with respect to her spouse); I.R.S. PuB. NO. 502, MEDICAL AND
DENTAL EXPENSES 3 (2009) (indicating that a taxpayer can claim a deduction for
her spouse's medical expenses even if they file separate returns); I.R.S. FORM
1040, SCHEDULE A, supra note 107, at I 11. 1-4 (requiring no reporting regarding
the person with respect to whom the deducted medical expenses were incurred);
I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE A (FORM 1040), at A-2 (2009) (same).
122I.R.C. §§ 71, 215.
123 BORIS 1. BITTKER
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS

LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
77.1.1 (2011), available at 1997 WL 439909.
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the payee's Social Security number on her tax return. 124 Enacted
in 1984, this identification and documentation requirement
closed the way to a well-trodden avenue of tax abuse where the
government would find itself whipsawed when "the payor would
deduct payments as alimony under § 215, but the payee would
not report the payments as income under § 71 ."1I5
There is, however, no documentation requirement with
respect to transfers of property between forner different-sex
spouses incident to a divorce (or, for that matter, between
spouses who are still married to each other). 126 Under § 1041,
the transferor Spouse recognizes no gain or loss on the transfer
of property, and the transferee Spouse excludes the property from
gross income as a gift and takes the property with a transferred
basis. 127 Neither spouse is required to notify the IRS of the
transfer; however, the transferor spouse is required to provide
the transferee spouse with information necessary to determine
the adjusted basis, holding period, and any investment credit
recapture with respect to the transferred property. 128
C.

Making Sense of Nonsense

The discussion in the preceding two sections of this Part
clearly establishes a baseline of identification and
documentation when it comes to affording (or denying) tax
benefits based on marital or familial status. Yet, as highlighted in
Table 1, Congress often creates different definitions of
"family" (and even of the marital unit) for purposes of different

124 I.R.C. § 215(c); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.215-IT (1984); I.R.S. PUB. No.

504, DIVORCED OR SEPARATED INDIVIDUALS 13 (2009).
125Paul C. Fcinberg Toni Robinson, A Household Is Not a Home: "Not

Members of the Same Household" in the Tax Treatment of Alimony Payments, 6
VA. TAX REV. 377, 379 n.8 (1986).
126See I.R.S. PUB. No. 504, supra note 124, at 19-21 (2009) (discussing
property settlements and mentioning no reporting requirements other than those
described infira text accompanying note 128).
127 I.R.C. § 1041(a)-(b); see also id. § 102 (excluding gifts from gross
income).
128Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041 - IT, QA (14) (as amended in 2003).
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Code sections. In a regime where the federal government
chooses a taxpayer's family for her, it may be appropriate to
expand or contract the scope of "family" based on the precise
policy to be achieved through a Code section. 129 But why would
Congress choose to underpin these differing definitions of
family (and of the marital unit) with a hodgepodge of explicit, de
facto, and duplicative requirements that-when measured
against a baseline of identification and documentation-leaves
some compliance gaps filled, others unfilled, and yet others
overfilled?
The only sense that can be made of this hodgepodge is that
it makes no sense at all. For instance, why is Congress so
concerned that taxpayers will claim an unwarranted additional
personal exemption ($3650 in 2009)130 absent a documentation
requirement, when it is apparently unfazed by the possibility that
taxpayers will either exploit or fall into the gap between the
expanded definition of dependent in § 221 and the
documentation requirement in § 151(e) and falsely or
erroneously claim a student loan interest deduction (a maximum
of $2500) 131 with respect to a dependent?1 32 Why wouldn't
Congress wish to close this and other gaps in the same way that
it gradually filled in and then completely closed the gap in the
documentation requirement in § 151 (e)?
As mentioned earlier, between 1986 and 1994, Congress
slowly lowered the age threshold for documenting dependents
129 See -Bridget J. Crawford, The Pivfits and Penalties of Kinship:
Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 3-4

(2005) ("A uniform definition [of family] would make the law easier to apply,
but it would result in systematic over-taxation or under-taxation. Instead the
[estate tax] statutes should be revised to use unique terms that apply for limited
purposes."). But see Infanti, supra note 46 (proposing an individual filing regime
in which taxpayers would choose their own family for tax purposes).
130Rev. Proc. 2008-66, § 3.19, 2008-2 C.B. 1107.
131I.R.C. § 221(b)(1).
132 Indeed, in terms of administering § 221, the legislative history
accompanying the provision's enactment evinces concern only with third-party
reporting by the lender to the borrower regarding the portion of interest
payments that qualify for the deduction. H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 368 (1997).
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and then eliminated it altogether. 133 By similarly closing the
remaining gaps in the identification and documentation
requirements for spouses and dependents, Congress would
discourage taxpayers from taking false or careless positions with
regard to other1 34family tax provisions in the hope of winning the
"audit lottery"
and escaping IRS scrutiny of those positions.
After all, the National Taxpayer Advocate has observed that
[T]he IRS can relatively easily verify:
* The existence and age of the person
associated with a Social Security number
(SSN);
* The mother and often the father of the
person associated with a SSN;
* The consistency of current year return data
with prior year returns (including filing
status); and
The earnings and other
taxpayer as reported by
(including on Form W-2,
Statement, and other
returns). 135

income of the
a third party
Wage and Tax
information

This may not be all of the information necessary to determine
the correctness of a position claimed with respect to a spouse or
dependent, but it may be enough to deter noncompliance. In fact,
the IRS requires more than a dependent's name, Social Security
number, and relationship to the taxpayer to determine the
133See supra note 65.

134
See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine " in

New Bottles, 55 TAx L. REV. 135, 161 (2002) ("The Scrvice's shockingly low
audit coverage makes the audit lottery an irresistible attraction; it is not even a
lottery, but rather a virtually sure thing."). For fiscal year 2008, the IRS audited
only 1% of individual income tax returns filed. I.R.S. PUB. NO. 55B, supra note
12, at 23 tbl.9a.
135I NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
365 (2008).
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correctness of a claim for an additional personal exemption; 136
nevertheless, requiring even this information has led to a
decrease in the number of false and erroneous claims for
additional personal exemptions with respect to dependents. 137
The failure to similarly-and systematically-close the
compliance gaps in the other family tax provisions discussed in
this Part bespeaks a lack of congressional attention to issues of
taxpayer compliance with the terms of those provisions. Put
differently, the lack of attention to obvious compliance issues
imparts a haphazard and uncoordinated feel to the administrative
structure underpinning the family tax provisions. In the next Part
of this Article, we will turn to the task of tracing the
interconnecting lines of subordination that have embedded
themselves within this administrative structure. Before
undertaking that task, however, it is important to underscore that
the hodgepodge of explicit, de facto, and duplicative
identification and documentation requirements that we
encountered in this Part does not appear to be the result of
deliberate action on the part of Congress or the IRS. To the
contrary, the haphazard and uncoordinated administrative
structure underpinning the family tax provisions provides
support for the notion that the interconnecting lines of
subordination that we will trace in the next Part of this Article
are the product of endemic privilegings-that is, privilegings
that have become so normal, so ingrained in our nature, such a
part of our "world-view" that they manifest themselves without
the conscious thought of legislators or regulators.
111.

Attribution Rules

To detect the interconnected lines of subordination that are
embedded in the family tax provisions discussed in Part 11, it
will be necessary to compare and contrast those provisions with
a different set of family tax provisions, namely the rules
attributing ownership (or, occasionally, other relevant attributes)
from one person to another for tax purposes. Tax consequences
often turn on a taxpayer's ownership of property. For instance, if
136See I.R.C. § 152.

'31See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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a taxpayer disposes of property that she owns, the taxpayer will
ordinarily be required to realize and recognize gain or loss on
the transaction. 138 If that property is stock and the disposition is
in the form of a redemption by the issuing corporation, whether
the gain or loss will be characterized as a sale or exchange (with
one set of tax consequences) or as a distribution taxable under
§ 301 (with a different set of tax consequences) will often
depend upon the amount of stock in the corporation that the
taxpayer continues to own after the disposition. 139 This is but
one example of the myriad ways in which property ownership is
relevant to determining the tax consequences of a financial
arrangement or transaction.
On a social or cultural level, an individual may be
indifferent as to whether she or someone else in her family is
considered the legal owner of property. From a tax perspective,
however, the individual may find that, without some special
statutory accommodation, dispersing ownership of property
within her family frustrates her ability to obtain an intended tax
benefit or, alternatively, opens the door to potential abuse of the
Code. 140 In an attempt to facilitate the delivery of tax benefits or
to frustrate potential abuse, many Code provisions require
taxpayers to take account of property owned by family members
when determining the tax treatment of their own financial
transactions or arrangements. For instance, in determining
whether the redemption of corporate stock described in the
previous paragraph will be treated as a sale or exchange or as a
distribution taxable under § 301, the redeeming shareholder
must, in most cases, not only take into account stock that she
herself owns following the redemption, but also stock owned by
members of her family (and certain entities, too). 141
In this Part, I will first describe the identification and
documentation requirements that attach to the § 267 and § 3 18
attribution rules, which are, by far, the most commonly
138I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c).
139Id. § 302.
140See supra note 4.
141 I.R.C.

§ 302(c).
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encountered attribution rules in the Code. Then I will describe
the small group of provisions that contain their own unique
attribution rules. With the necessary background in place, I will
turn in the final section of this Part to comparing and contrasting
the identification and documentation requirements that apply to
the attribution rules with those discussed in Part 11 (and, to a
lesser extent, Part I) of this Article.
A. The § 267 and § 318 Attribution Rules
3.

No Documentation Required

The primary Code sections that attribute ownership of
property from one taxpayer to another are §§ 267 and 318. Each
contains a set of attribution rules that treats an individual
taxpayer as if she owned property that is actually owned by her
family members or by certain entities. Neither of these
provisions requires a taxpayer to identify or document family
members to or from whom the ownership of property is
attributed. In the vast majority of cases, the substantive Code
provisions that incorporate these attribution rules by reference
do not contain identification or documentation requirements
either. Indeed, the following is a list of some sixty instances of
provisions that incorporate the attribution rules of § 267 or § 318
by reference but impose no identification or documentation
requirements regarding relationships that give rise to the
constructive ownership of property:
Sections 45A, 51, 1396, and 1400H (disallowing the
Indian employment, work opportunity,
empowerment zone, and renewal community
employment credits for wages paid to 42related
persons and certain owners of the business)1

142

Id. §§ 45A(c)(5), 51(i)(1), 1396(d)(2), 1400H; see I.R.S. FORM 5584:

(requiring no reporting regarding the
relationship between the taxpayer claiming the credit and the persons with
respect to whom the credit is being claimed); I.R.S. FORM 8844: EMPOWERMENT
WORK OPPORTUNITY CREDIT (2009)

ZONE AND RENEWAL COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT CREDIT

(2009) (same, and also

not requiring reporting regarding the ownership of the business by individuals
who are treated as qualified employees); I.R.S. FORM 8845: INDIAN
EMPLOYMENT CREDIT (2009) (same).
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* Section 45F (disallowing the employer-provided
childcare credit in the case of facilities that
discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees and facilities that do not enroll a
sufficient number of employees' dependents if the
facility is 143
the principal trade or business of the
employer)
* Sections 79, 105, 117, 125, 127, 129, 132, and 137
(restricting tax benefits in the case of discrimination

143 I.R.C. § 45F(c)(2)(B); see I.R.S. FORM 8882: CREDIT FOR EMPLOYERPROVIDED CHILDCARE FACILITIES AND SERVICES (2006) (requiring no reporting

regarding the use of the childcare facility by highly compensated employees or
by employees' dependents).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OFGENDER ANDLAW

in favor of key or highly compensated employees,
44
which include certain owners of the business)

'4
I.R.C. §§ 79(d), 117(d)(3), 105(h)(5), 125(b)(2), (j)(3)(D)(iii)-(iv),
127(b)(2), 129(d)(2), 1320)(6), 137(c)(2); see I.R.S. PUB. No. 15-B,
EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS 13 (2010) (describing the
application of § 79 to key employees and making no mention of any reporting
requirement other than including the value of group-term life insurance in the
key employee's wages on the Form W-2); id. at 2-4 (similarly describing the
application of § 125 but mentioning no reporting requirements); id. at 6-7
(similarly describing the application of § 105 but mentioning no reporting
requirements); id. at 7-8 (similarly describing the application of § 137 but
mentioning no reporting requirements other than on the Form W-2); id. at 8-9
(similarly describing the application of § 129 but mentioning no reporting
requirements other than on the Form W-2); id. at 9-10 (similarly describing the
application of § 127 but mentioning no reporting requirements); id. at 10, 17-18
(similarly describing the application of § 132 but mentioning no reporting
requirements); I.R.S. Pub. No. 970, supra note 101, at 8 (similarly describing the
application of § 117 and only mentioning the need to report any taxable amount
as wages on Form W-2); see also supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text
for a discussion of newly enacted § 45R.

Section 6039D would require employers to report the number of highly
compensated employees covered by any plan under §§ 79, 105, 106, 125, 127,
129, or 137; however, this reporting requirement has been suspended until the
IRS issues further guidance. I.R.S. Notice 2002-24, 2002-1 C.B. 785. It is also
worth noting that, in contrast to the discussion of employment-related exclusions
for benefits provided to dependents, see supra Part lI.A.3.a, the employer in this
situation cannot be said to be acting as a third party who can be counted on to
verify compliance because the person to whom the attribution rules applies, as an
owner of the business, is, in effect, also the employer. See generally Leandra
Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007) (discussing when third parties can
effectively be used to monitor and verify taxpayer compliance).
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Section 101(j) (stripping tax advantages typically
from certain
associated with life insurance
145
employer-owned life insurance)
Section 121 (denying an exclusion from gross
in a
income to the sale of a remainder 1interest
46
principal residence to a related person)
Section 167 (denying depreciation deductions upon
interests in
a purchase of term and 14remainder
7
property by related persons)
Section 170 (permitting a deduction equal to the full
fair market value of qualified appreciated stock
donated to a private nonoperating foundation, but

only to contributions by the taxpayer and her family

145 I.R.C. § 101(j)(2)(A), (B);
regarding persons related to the owner
of a notice and consent requirement,
application of § 101(j); rather, the

see id. § 60391 (requiring no reporting
of the contract or, aside from satisfaction
with regard to the exceptions from the
taxpayer is directed to keep necessary

records); I.R.S. FORM 8925: REPORT OF EMPLOYER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE

CONTRACTS (2010) (same); see also BtTTKER LOKKEN, supra note 123,
12.2.2A, available at 1997 WL 439538 (explaining how employer-owned life
insurance had been used as a tax shelter). Related persons are absolved from
complying with the applicable reporting requirements, despite being included
within the definition of "applicable policyholder" in the statute. I.R.S. Notice
2009-48, QA(l7), 2009-I C.B. 1085.
146I.R.C. § 121(d)(8). A taxpayer must ostensibly elect to exclude from
gross income gain on the sale of a remainder interest in a principal residence.
Trcas. Reg. § 1.121-4(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 2002). However, the election
requires no reporting or documentation. I(. § 1.121-4(e)(2)(iii) ("The taxpayer
makes the election under this paragraph (c)(2) by filing a return for the taxable
year of the sale or exchange that does not include the gain from the sale or
exchange of the remainder interest in the taxpayer's gross income.").
147I.R.C. § 167(c); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1361-62, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2831-32 (describing the abuse that this provision is
intended to curtail).
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of no more148 than 10% of the stock in the
corporation)

from a
Section 179 (rendering property purchased
149
related person ineligible for expensing)
Section 221 (denying the deduction for educational
150
loan interest to loans from related persons)
Section 263A (requiring farmers who elect to
currently deduct otherwise capitalizable costs
relating to plants with a preproductive period of
more than two years-as well as anyone related to
the farmer making this election-to use the
alternative depreciation system of § 168(g)(2) with
respect to property predominantly used in their

148 I.R.C. § 170(c)(5); see I.R.S. FORM 8283: NONCASH CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS, at I pt. I (2009); I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8283, at 4
(2009) [hereinafter FORM 8283 INSTRUCTIONS] (on a donation of securities,

requiring no disclosure of the percentage of stock of the corporation currently
and previously donated by the taxpayer and members of her family; moreover,
when entering the fair market value of property on Form 8283, a supporting
statement is only required if § 170 requires a reduction in the fair market value of
the property, which is not the case for qualified appreciated stock).
149 I.R.C. § 179(d)(2); see id. § 179(c)(1) (flush language) (generally
delegating to the Treasury Department the task of prescribing the requirements
for making a § 179 election); Treas. Reg. § 1.179-5(a) (flush language) (as
amended in 1995) (requiring only that taxpayers "maintain records which permit
specific identification of each piece of section 179 property and reflect how and
from whom such property was acquired and when such property was placed in
service"); see I.R.S. FORM 4562: DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION, at I pt. 1
(2009) (requiring no disclosure of how and from whom § 179 property was
acquired).
150I.R.C. § 221(d)(1) (flush language); see FORM 1040, supra note 26, at I
1.33 (requiring no reporting regarding the relationship between the taxpayer and
her creditor); FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 79, at 34 (same).
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farming businesses 151
and placed in service while the
election is in effect)
Sections 263A, 269A, 280H, 441, 444, 465, 469,
and 775 (all defining, in one15 2 form or another,
"personal service corporation")'
Section 274 (excepting certain entertainment
expenses primarily for the benefit of non-highly
153
compensated employees from disallowance)
Sections 280A and 163 (determining154whether a
residence is used for personal purposes)

'5'
I.R.C. § 263A(d)(3), (c)(2); see Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-4(d)(3)(i) (as
amended in 2000) (permitting a taxpayer to make the election out of
capitalization merely by filing a return applying the relevant tax rules); see I.R.S.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE F (FORM 1040), at F-4 (2009) [hereinafter
SCHEDULE F INSTRUCTIONS] (requiring no reporting); see also Treas. Reg. §

1.263A-4(d)(5), ex. 2 (as amended in 2000) (illustrating the application of the
alternative depreciation system to persons related to the farmer making an
election out of the capitalization rules of § 263A).
152 I.R.C. §§ 263A(h)(3)(D), 269A(b)(2), (3), 280H(f)(5), 441(i)(2),
444(0, 465(e)(7)(B)(ii), 469(j)(2), 775(b)(2)(A); see I.R.S. FORM 1065-B: U.S.
RETURN OF INCOME FOR ELECTING LARGE PARTNERSHIPS (2009) (requiring no

reporting regarding ownership by personal service corporations); I.R.S. FORM
1120: U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN, at I item A, box 3 (2009)
(merely requiring a corporation to check a box if it qualifies as a personal service
corporation); I.R.S. FORM 1120, SCHEDULE H: SECTION 280H LIMITATIONS FOR A
PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (2009) (requiring no reporting regarding the
ownership of a personal service corporation); I.R.S. FORM 6198: AT-RISK
LIMITATIONS (2009) (same); I.R.S. FORM 8716: ELECTION TO HAVE A TAX YEAR
OTHER THAN A REQUIRED TAX YEAR (2008) (same); I.R.S. FORM 8820:
CORPORATE PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSS AND CREDIT LIMITATIONS (2009) (same);
I.R.S. PUB. NO. 538, ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS 21 (2008) (describing

the rules of § 263A(h), but making no mention of any reporting requirements).
153 I.R.C. § 274(e)(4); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(c)(7)(ii) (as
amended in 2010) (waiving the strict substantiation requirements that normally
apply to entertainment expenses).
154 I.R.C. §§ 280A(d)(2), 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(ll); see I.R.S. FORM 8829:
EXPENSES FOR BUSINESS USE OF YOUR HOME (2009) (requiring no reporting

regarding the personal use of the home).
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Sections 302 and 356 (determining the tax
consequences of actual redemptions of corporate
stock as well as the fictive redemptions that
determine the tax characterization of gain
an
recognized by a shareholder in conjunction 1with
55
otherwise tax-free corporate reorganization)
redemptions through related
Section 304 (governing
156

corporations)

Section 57306 (dealing with preferred stock
bailouts)

5 I.R.C. §§ 302(c), 356(a)(2); cf I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-15-019 (Apr.
12, 1991) (permitting a redeeming corporation to discharge its obligation to
report dividend payments under I.R.C. § 6042 by filing a Form 1099-B along
with an explanatory statement, in lieu of a Form 1099-DIV, where the
corporation has insufficient facts to determine whether a distribution in
redemption of stock will be characterized as a dividend at the shareholder level);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-15-012 (Apr. 13, 1990) (same with respect to an amount
that might be rccharacterized as a dividend under § 356(a)(2)).
A taxpayer who wishes to waive application of the family attribution rules
of § 318(a)(1) in order to qualify for a redemption as an exchange
under
§ 302(b)(3) must file an agreement with the IRS. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2). This
agreement requires no reporting of the relationships that trigger attribution under
§ 318. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4 (as amended in 2007). All "significant"
shareholders must also file a statement with their returns upon redemption of
stock; however, this statement need only include the fair market value and basis
of the stock redeemed and a description of the property given by the corporation
in exchange for that stock. Id. § 1.302-2(b)(2). Similarly, all "significant"
shareholders must file a statement with their returns for the year in which a
reorganization exchange, occurred; again, however, this statement need only
include the names and employer identification numbers of the corporate parties
to the reorganization, the date of the reorganization exchange, and the fair market
value and basis of the target corporation stock exchanged by the shareholder in
the reorganization. Id. § 1.368-3(b) (2007).
156
I.R.C. § 304(b)(1), (b)(3)(B)(iii)(1), (c)(3); see supra note 155.
157I.R.C. § 306(b)(1), (c)(4); see FORM 1040, supra note 26, at II1. 9, 21
(requiring no reporting regarding § 306 stock); I.R.S. FORM 1040, SCHEDULE B:
INTEREST AND ORDINARY DIVIDENDS, at I pt. II (2009) (same); I.R.S. FORM
1040, SCHEDULE D: CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES (2009) (same); FORM 1040
INSTRUCTIONS,

supra note 79, at 22-23, 29 (same).
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* Section 336 (disallowing losses on certain
distributions of property to related158 persons in
complete liquidation of a corporation)
* Section 354 (excepting nonqualified preferred stock
from treatment as boot in the recapitalization of a
family-owned corporation) 159
160
* Section 355 (addressing corporate divisions)

* Section 61382 (preventing the trafficking of corporate
1
losses)
* Section 447 (requiring large corporations and
partnerships with a corporate partner that are in the

158 I.R.C. § 336(d)(1); see I.R.S. FORM 966: CORPORATE DISSOLUTION OR
LIQUIDATION (2007) (requiring reporting only of the fact of liquidation); see also

I.R.C. § 6043(a) (imposing this reporting requirement); Treas. Reg. § 1.6043-1
(as amended in 1983) (same); see id. § 1.6043-2(a) (as amended in 2007)
(requiring a liquidating corporation to report the amount of liquidating
distributions to its shareholders on Form 1099); id. § 1.33 1-l(d) (as amended in
2007) (under certain circumstances, requiring "significant" shareholders of a
liquidating corporation to file a statement with their tax returns that includes a
description of the property received in exchange for their surrendered stock);
I.R.S. FORM 1099-DIV: DIVIDENDS AND DISTRIBUTIONS, at boxes 8-9 (2009)

(requiring a liquidating corporation to report the dollar amount of cash and
noncash liquidating distributions to shareholders).
159I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(C); see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3(b) (2007) (requiring
"significant" shareholders to file a statement with their returns for the year. in
which a reorganization exchange occurs, but requiring no reporting regarding the
status of the recapitalized corporation as family owned).
160I.R.C. § 355(d)(7)-(8), (e)(4)(C), (g)(2)(B)(ii)(lll), (g)(3); see Treas.
Reg. § 1.355-5 (2007) (requiring only minimal reporting regarding corporate
divisions described in § 355).
161I.R.C. § 382()(3); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(h) (as amended in
2007); see Treas. Reg. § 1.382-11(a) (2007); see id. § 1.382-2T(a)(2)(ii) (as
amended in 2007) (requiring the loss corporation to file a statement with its tax
return for any taxable year in which an owner shift occurred, but not requiring
the loss corporation to disclose information regarding the ownership of the
corporation).
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farming to use the accrual method of
business of162
accounting)
Section 460 (excepting closely held pass-through
entities from required use of the simplified lookback method when reporting income from longon the percentage of completion
term contracts
163
method)
Section 464 (providing a family-based exception to
taxpayers' deductions
the limitation on cash-method
164
for prepaid farm supplies)

Section 465 (determining amounts considered at
the at-risk
risk and carving out an exception from
165
rules for certain corporate taxpayers)

162I.R.C. § 447(e), (h); see Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (as amended in 2006)
(only requiring consent for a change in method of accounting, not for the
adoption of a method of accounting); I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 3 115, at 1
(2009) (same); see also I.R.S. PUB. No. 225, FARMER'S TAX GUIDE 6 (2009)

(making no mention of any reporting requirements under § 447 and merely
referring taxpayers to § 447 for more details on the exception for family
corporations).
163 I.R.C. § 460(b)(4); see I.R.S. FORM 8697: INTEREST COMPUTATION
UNDER THE LOOK-BACK METHOD FOR COMPLETED LONG-TERM CONTRACTS

(2002) (requiring the taxpayer to indicate whether it is a pass-through entity, but
not requiring the information necessary to determine whether that pass-through
entity is closely held).
I- I.R.C. § 464(f)(3)(B)(iii); see SCHEDULE F INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
151, at F-4 (making no mention of any reporting requirements and referring
taxpayers to I.R.S. Pub. No. 225, supra note 162, for further discussion of
§ 464).

165I.R.C. § 465(b), (c)(7); see FORM 6198, supra note 152 (requiring no
reporting regarding the source of financing or qualification for the exception
from the at-risk rules for qualified C corporations).
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Section 468B (prescribing 66the tax treatment of
designated settlement funds)1

Section 469 (excepting dispositions of a taxpayer's
entire interest in a passive activity in a fully taxable
transaction to an unrelated person from the passive
activity limitations and excepting rental real estate
activities in which the taxpayer materially
participates from the per se passive activity
rule if
167
the taxpayer is a real estate professional)
Section 483 (providing a cap on the rate used for
calculating unstated interest on certain sales of
business or
investment land between family
68
members)

166I.R.C. § 468B(d)(3); see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.468B -3(e) (as amended in
2006) (respectively, applying the rules of Trcas. Reg. § 1.468B-3 to designated
settlement funds and requiring the transferor to a qualified settlement fund to
provide a statement to the administrator of the fund documenting transfers to the
fund; notably, however, the transferor is not required to furnish any information
regarding whether any amount transferred consists of stock or indebtedness of
the transferor or a related person or may be transferred back from the fund to the
transferor or a related person, either of which would render the payment
ineligible for treatment as a "qualified payment" for purposes of § 468B); I.R.S.
FORM 1120-SF: U.S. INCOME TAX RETURN FOR SETTLEMENT FUNDS (UNDER
SECTION 468B) (2007) (requiring no reporting that relates directly to the sundry
"related person" prohibitions in § 468B).
167 I.R.C. § 469(c)(7)(D)(ii), (g)(1); see I.R.S. FORM 8582: PASSIVE
ACTIVITY Loss LIMITATIONS (2009) (requiring no reporting regarding the
identity of the purchaser of the taxpayer's interest in a passive activity or the
taxpayer's ownership interest if an employee in a rental real estate business);
I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8582, at 2, 6-7 (2009) (same); I.R.S. FORM
8810: CORPORATE

PASSIVE ACTIVITY Loss AND CREDIT LIMITATIONS

(2009)

(requiring no reporting regarding the identity of the purchaser of the taxpayer's
interest in a passive activity); I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8810, at 5 (2009)
(same).
168 I.R.C. § 483(e); see id. §§ 483(g)(3), 1275(b) (excepting debt
instruments received in exchange for the transfer of personal use property from
the purview of § 483); id. § 6049(b)(2)(A) (excepting from information reporting
interest on obligations issued by natural persons); I.R.S. FORM 1099-S:
PROCEEDS FROM REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (2009) (requiring no reporting of

unstated interest).
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Section 613A (requiring the volume cap on
percentage depletion for oil and gas wells available
to independent producers and royalty owners to be
split among family
members and- commonly
69
controlled entities)1
Section 631 (disqualifying dispositions of coal or
iron ore subject to a retained economic interest that
are made to a related person from
eligibility for
170
inclusion in the § 1231 hotchpot)
Section 988 (expanding the definition of § 1256
contracts for electing qualified
funds and
171
prescribing their tax treatment)
Section 1060 (authorizing the IRS to require
reporting of employment contracts, covenants not to
compete, royalty and lease agreements, or other
similar arrangements entered into by a 10% owner
of an entity-or a person related to the 10% owner

169 I.R.C. § 613A(c)(8); see Trcas. Reg. § L.613A-6 (1977) (imposing
limited recordkceping requirements that do not touch on the sharing of the
volume cap by commonly controlled entities and family members); I.R.S. PUB.
No. 535, BUSINESS EXPENSEs 32-37 (2009) (making no mention of reporting
requirements).
170 I.R.C. § 63 1(c); see I.R.S. FORM 4797: SALES OF BUSINESS PROPERTY,
at I pt. 1, I. 2 (2009) (requiring no reporting regarding the purchaser's identity or
relationship to the taxpayer); I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 4797, at 5 (2009)
[hereinafter FORM 4797 INSTRUCTIONS] (same).

171I.R.C. § 988(c)(I)(E); see Treas. Reg. § 1.988-1(a)(8)(iv) (as amended
in 2001) (prescribing the requirements for making an election to bc treated as a
qualified fund, but rcquiring no information regarding the ownership of the
partnership making the election).
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-in connection with a transfer of an interest in the
172
entity)
Section 1202 (denying the exclusion of gain on the

sale or exchange of qualified small business stock
when the corporation has redeemed more than a de
minimis amount of stock from the taxpayer or a
related person or entered into an offsetting short
position prior to the time when the requisite five73
year holding period has been met)'
Section 1235 (extending long-term capital gain or
loss treatment to certain
transfers of patent rights to
74
unrelated persons)
Section 1237 (permitting certain subdivided real
property to be treated as property not held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business-and, therefore, to potentially become
eligible for long-term capital gain or loss

treatment)

75

172I.R.C. § 1060(c). Regulations have yet to be issued implementing this
reporting requirement. Mark J. Silverman, Purchase Price Allocation Rules:
Sections 1060, 338 and 197, in STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS,
SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS RESTRUCTURINGS
2009, at 803, 830 (PLI Tax Law Estate Planning, Course Handbook Ser. No.
878, 2009); see I.R.S. FORM 8594: ASSET ACQUISITION STATEMENT UNDER
SECTION 1060, at I I. 6 (2006) (making no mention of reporting regarding 10%
owners or persons related to them).
173 I.R.C. § 1202(c)(3), (j) (2010); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1202-2(a) (1997)
(providing the de minimis exception to § 1202(c)(3)); I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR
SCHEDULE D (FORM 1040), at D-5 (2009) [hereinafter SCHEDULE D
INSTRUCTIONS] (setting forth the manner tbr reporting § 1202 gain).
174 I.R.C. § 1235(d); see FORM 1040, SCHEDULE D, supra note 157
(requiring no special reporting regarding dispositions of patents, let alone
reporting regarding transfers to related persons); SCHEDULE D INSTRUCTIONS,
supra note 173 (same); FORM 4797, supra note 170 (same); FORM 4797
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 170 (same).
175 I.R.C. § 1237(a)(2)(A); see FORM 1040, SCHEDULE D, supra note 157
(requiring no reporting regarding subdivided real property); SCHEDULE D
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 173, at D-3 (same).
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Section 1239 (applying ordinary income treatment
of depreciable
to gain on the sale or exchange
176
property between related persons)

Section 1259 (deeming an appreciated financial
a
position to have been sold when the taxpayer 1or
77
related person enters into an offsetting position)
Section 1366 (permitting the IRS to make
adjustments if an S corporation shareholder
furnishes capital or services to the corporation and
does not receive reasonable compensation therefor
and the shareholder has family members who are

also shareholders of the S corporation)

178

Section 1372 (in many cases, preventing an S
corporation shareholder from excluding fringe
benefits

from

gross

income

because

the

S

corporation is treated as a partnership and 2%
shareholders of the S corporation are treated as

partners' for purposes

of applying

179
concerning fringe benefits)

tax rules

176I.R.C. § 1239(b)-(c); see FORM 4797, supra note 170 (requiring no
reporting regarding sales or exchanges of depreciable property between related
persons); FORM 4797 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 170 (same).
177I.R.C. § 1259(c)(4); see I.R.S. PUB. No. 550, INVESTMENT INCOME AND
EXPENSES 40 (2009) (making no mention of any special reporting requirements
for constructive sales of appreciated financial positions); FORM 1040, SCHEDULE
D, supra note 157 (same); SCHEDULE D INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 173, at D-3
(same).
178 I.R.C. § 1366(e); see I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1120-S, at 15

(2009) [hereinafter FORM 1120-S INSTRUCTIONS] (describing § 1366(c), but
making no mention of any associated reporting requirements).
179I.R.C. § 1372(b); see JAMES S. EUSTICE JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL
11.04 (2009), available at 1999 WL
INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS
597165 (explaining these rules); see also I.R.S. FORM 1120-S: U.S. INCOME TAX
RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION (2009) (requiring no identification of 2%
shareholders of the corporation); FORM 1120-S INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 178, at
15 (same).
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393

* Section 1400B (rendering related-party transactions
ineligible for the 0% capital gains rate applicable to
DC zone assets) 180
* Section 1400C (rendering related-party transactions
ineligible for the DC first-time homebuyer credit)' 8 1
* Section 4985 (imposing an excise tax on stock
compensation
of insiders in expatriated
82corporations)'
4.

Limited Documentation Required

A much smaller group of provisions incorporate the § 267
or § 318 attribution rules by reference and impose some limited
reporting or documentation requirements. In this section, 1
describe these provisions and their associated reporting
requirements. Notably, none of the provisions described below
requires meaningful or significant reporting of the familial or
other relationships that cause a taxpayer to be treated as
constructively owning property.
Section 108(e)(4) prevents a taxpayer from avoiding
discharge of indebtedness income by treating a related person's
acquisition of a taxpayer's debt as the acquisition of the debt by
the taxpayer herself. For purposes of determining which persons
will be considered related to the taxpayer/debtor, § 108(e)(4)
applies a modified version of the § 267 attribution rules. 183 The
Treasury regulations require only limited reporting with regard
to this antiabuse rule. The taxpayer/debtor must file a statement
180I.R.C. § 1400B(c)(5); see SCHEDULE D INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 173,
at D-6 (requiring no reporting regarding the identity of the purchaser of the DC
zone asset).
181
COLUMBIA

I.R.C.

§ 1400C(e)(2)(A);

FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER

see I.R.S. FORM 8859: DISTRICT OF
CREDIT (2009) (requiring no reporting

regarding the identity of the seller of the DC zone asset).
182 I.R.C. § 4985(a)(2); see FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 79, at

46 (making no mention of any reporting requirements regarding related persons);
I.R.S. PUB. NO. 525, TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME 11 (2009) (same).
183I.R.C. § 108(e)(4)(A)-(B).
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with her return explaining why the holder of her debt did not
acquire that debt in anticipation of becoming related to the
taxpayer/debtor if either (1) the debt constitutes 25% or more of
the fair market value of the total gross assets of the "holder
group" or (2) the holder acquires the- debt six months or more
but less than twenty-four months prior to the time the holder
became related to the taxpayer/debtor.184 Outside of these two
circumstances, no specific reporting is required under § 108(e)
Section 170(a)(3) postpones the deduction for a charitable
contribution of a future interest in tangible property until such
time as all intervening interests in the property have either
expired or are held by persons other than the taxpayer or persons
related to the taxpayer.185 The IRS does require the taxpayer/
donor of a partial interest in property to disclose the location
where the property is kept as well as the identity of any person
(other than the donee charitable organization) that has actual
possession of the property. 186 There is, however, no requirement
that the taxpayer/donor indicate whether the person with actual
possession of the property is a related person or whether any
persons who have an interest in the property (other than the
charitable organization) are related to the taxpayer/donor.87
Even in the case of property for which a charitable contribution
deduction of more than $5000 is claimed, neither the qualified
appraisal that must be retained by the taxpayer/donor nor the
qualified appraisal summary that must be provided to the IRS
requires the disclosure of the relationship between the taxpayer/
donor and others to whom an interest in the property has been
reserved. 188

184Treas. Reg. § 1.108-2(c)(4) (1992).
1'5 SeeTreas. Reg. § I.170A-5(a)(1) (as amended in 1994).
1s6FORM 8283, supra note 148, at I

§ A, pt. II, II. 2(d)-(c).

187Id.; FORM 8283 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 148, at 4.

188 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(D)(2), -13(c)(4)(ii) (as amended in
1996); FORM 8283, supra note 148, at 2 § B.
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Section 280F limits the ability of taxpayers to make the
§ 179 election to expense property and provides less generous
depreciation rules with respect to "listed property" (e.g.,
passenger automobiles, entertainment property, computers, and
cellular telephones) that is "not predominantly used in a
qualified business use." 189 For this purpose, neither leasing listed
property to a 5% owner or a related person nor providing the use
of listed property to a 5% owner or related person as
compensation for personal services constitutes a "qualified
business use."'190 The determination of whether an individual is a
5% owner or a related person is accomplished through the
application of attribution rules. 191 Though the taxpayer is not
required to identify and document 5% owners and related
persons, taxpayers are required to report whether listed property
is predominantly used in a qualified business use and to indicate
whether they have evidence to support the claimed business use
of the property. 192
Section 643(i) provides that if a foreign trust makes a loan
of cash or marketable securities (or permits the use of other trust
property) to a person related to a U.S. grantor or U.S.
beneficiary of the trust, then the amount of the loan (or the fair
market value of the use of the property) will be treated as a
distribution to the related U.S. grantor or U.S. beneficiary of the
foreign trust. Both the foreign trust and the U.S. grantor or U.S.
beneficiary who is deemed to receive this constructive
distribution from the trust must report the distribution to the
IRS.193 Nonetheless, neither the foreign trust nor the U.S.
189I.R.C. § 280F(b)(I), (d)(I).

190Id. § 280F(d)(6)(C)(i).
191Id. § 280F(d)(6)(D).
192 FORM 4562, supra note 149, at 2 pt. V; see I.R.C. § 274(d)(4)

(imposing substantiation requirements on deductions for listed property); Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(d)(2)-(3) (as amended in 2010) (providing the authority
for requiring the disclosure of information on Form 4562).
193 I.R.S. FORM 3520-A: ANNUAL INFORMATION

RETURN OF FOREIGN

TRUST WITH A U.S. OWNER, at 2 pt. II, 1. 17 (2009); I.R.S. FORM 3520: ANNUAL
RETURN TO REPORT TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN TRUSTS AND RECEIPT OF

CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS, at 4 pt. I11,I1.25-28 (2009).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OFGENDER ANDLAW

grantor or U.S. beneficiary is required to identify the related
was made that triggered the
person to whom the loan
94
constructive distribution. 1
Section 707(b)(1) disallows losses on sales or exchanges of
property between (1) a partnership and a person who owns more
than 50% of the capital or profits interests in the partnership and
(2) commonly controlled partnerships (i.e., partnerships in which
the same persons own more than 50% of the capital or profits
interests). Section 707(b)(2) recharacterizes as ordinary income
gain on the sale or exchange of property between these same two
classes of persons where the property is not a capital asset in the
hands of the transferee. For purposes of both of these provisions,
ownership of the partnership's (or partnerships') capital and
profits interests is determined using a modified version of the
constructive ownership rules in § 267(c).19 5 As part of its annual
return, a partnership is required to identify and document
individuals and entities that own 50% or more of its capital or
96
profits interests (applying constructive ownership rules).'
Nevertheless, no reporting is required regarding transactions
between the partnership and controlling individuals and entities
or between the partnership and other partnerships under common
control. 197
Section 1033 permits a taxpayer whose property has been
compulsorily or involuntarily converted into money (or into
194FORM 3520-A, supra note 193, at 2 pt. 11, 1. 17; FORM 3520, supra note

193, at 4 pt. 111,11.25-28; see I.R.C. 6048(c) (providing the authority for these
information-rcporting requirements); I.R.S. Notice 97-34, § V.A., 1997-1 C.B.

422 (providing guidance on the reporting requirements under § 6048(c)).
195I.R.C. § 707(b)(3).
196

I.R.S.

FORM

1065, SCHEDULE B-I: INFORMATION ON PARTNERS

OWNING 50% OR MORE OF THE PARTNERSHIP (2009).
197 Id.;

FORM 1040, SCHEDULE D, supra note 157; I.R.S. FORM 1065: U.S.

RETURN OF PARTNERSHIP INCOME, at 4 sched. K (2009); I.R.S. FORM 1065,
SCHEDULE D: CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES (2009); I.R.S. FoRM 1065, SCHEDULE
K-I: PARTNER'S SHARE OF INCOME DEDUCTIONS, CREDITS, ETC. (2009); FORM
4797, supra note 170; see I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1065, at 37-40 (2009)
[hereinafter FORM 1065 INSTRUCTIONS] (listing the items to be included in the

catch-all category of line 20c on Schedule K, but not mentioning § 707(b)
transactions).
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property that is not similar to the converted property) to elect to
postpone the recognition of gain, provided that the taxpayer
purchases replacement property (or stock in a corporation that
owns such property) within a specified time frame.198 To prevent
the taxpayer from "obtain[ing] significant (and possibly
indefinite or permanent) tax deferral without any additional cash
outlay to acquire new properties,"' 99 § 1033(i) generally
prohibits C corporations, certain partnerships with corporate
partners, and other taxpayers with large gains from involuntary
conversions from electing to postpone the recognition of gain if
the taxpayer purchased the replacement property from a related
person. No form is provided for making a § 1033 election;
rather, the regulations provide:
All of the details in connection with an
involuntary conversion of property at a gain
(including those relating to the replacement of
the converted property, or a decision not to
replace, or the expiration of the period for
replacement) shall be reported in the return for
the taxable year or years in which any of such
gain is realized. 200
The regulations make no specific mention of any need to
identify the person from whom the taxpayer acquired the
replacement property. This is not surprising because these
regulations were last amended prior to the enactment of
§ 1033(i). 20 1 What is surprising, however, is that the relevant
publication explaining these rules to taxpayers was produced
more than a decade after the enactment of § 1033(i) and explains
the effect of § 1033(i), but still makes no mention of identifying
the person from whom replacement property was acquired as a
198I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2).
199JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, PUB. No. JCS-12-96, GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 10 (1996).

200 Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1981); see also I.R.S.
PUB. NO. 544, SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS 10 (2010).
20!The regulations were last amended in 1981, see supra note 200, while
§ 1033(i) was not enacted until 1995. Act of Apr. 11,1995, Pub. L. No. 104-7,
§ 3, 109 Stat. 93, 94.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

necessary "detail" that should be addressed in the statement
making the election to postpone gain. 20 2 Indeed, notwithstanding
the categorical tone of the text quoted above, the regulations
actually permit a taxpayer to make an effective election to
regarding the
postpone gain without providing any details
20 3
involuntary conversion of her property at all.
Section 5881 imposes a 50% excise tax on so-called
greenmail payments. The tax applies to a corporation's direct or
indirect acquisition of its stock from a shareholder who has held
her stock for less than two years, provided that (1) the
acquisition of the stock is not on terms available to all of the
corporation's shareholders and (2) either the shareholder,
someone acting in concert with the shareholder, or someone
related to the shareholder or a person acting in concert with the
shareholder made (or threatened to make) a public tender offer
for the corporation's stock during the two-year period prior to
the acquisition. 20 4 The taxpayer reports the greenmail transaction
and calculates the excise tax on Form 8725.205 This form
requires absolutely no reporting about the identity of the person
who made (or threatened to make) the public tender offerwhether it was the taxpayer herself, someone acting in concert
with her, or a related person. 206
In the international area, which is notoriously open to
arbitrage of the differential taxation of U.S. and foreign persons,
202I.R.S. PUB. No. 544, supra note 200, at 8-9, 10.
203

A failure to so include such gain in gross income in the
regular manner shall be deemed to be an election by the
taxpayer to have such gain recognized only to the extent
provided in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph even
though the details in connection with the conversin are
not reported in such return.

Treas. Reg. § 1.1 033(a)-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1981) (emphasis added).
204 I.R.C. § 588 1(b) (LEXIS through July 2010 amendments).
205I.R.S. FORM 8725: ExciSE TAX ON GREENMAIL (2008).
206

Id.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

attribution of ownership rules play a key role in preventing
abuse. 207 Accordingly, for purposes of the Subpart F rules, a
modified version of the § 318 attribution rules applies in
determining (1) whether a foreign corporation qualifies as a
"controlled foreign corporation," (2) whether a taxpayer will be
classified as a "U.S. shareholder" of that controlled foreign
corporation, and (3) the amount of a U.S. shareholder's income
inclusion with respect to her stock in the controlled foreign
corporation. 208 The § 267 attribution rules apply in determining
whether income from the factoring of a related person's
receivables will be recharacterized as interest income for
purposes of both the Subpart F rules and the foreign tax credit
limitation under § 904.209 In addition, the § 318 attribution rules
apply to prevent taxpayers from circumventing the recognition
of gain on an outbound § 351 exchange by instead contributing
property to the capital of a foreign corporation. 210 Furthermore,
both the § 267 and § 318 attribution rules apply in determining
whether certain income from U.S.-owned foreign corporations
should be recharacterized as arising from domestic sources for
purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation under § 904.211
Nonetheless, §§ 6038 and 6046 require only limited
information reporting by shareholders of foreign corporations
regarding their ownership of those corporations. 2 12 Section 6038
requires information reporting only by U.S. controlling
shareholders (i.e., those who own more than 50% of the total
combined voting power or total value of the foreign corporation

207 Given the unique administrative issues raised by taxing nonresident
aliens and other foreign persons, I have confined my discussion here to the
portions of the U.S. international tax regime that concern the foreign activities of
U.S. persons. See 2 JOEL D. KUNTz
TAXATION C2.01 (2005).

ROBERT J. PERONt, U.S. INTERNATIONAL

208I.R.C. §§ 95 1(b), 954(d)(3), 956(c)(2), 957, 958(b).
2091d. § 864(d).
2101(1.§ 367(c)(2).
211I.

§ 904(h).

212Id. § 6038(a).
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for an uninterrupted period of 30 days during the year),213 and §
6046 requires information reporting only by those U.S.
shareholders of a foreign corporation who experience a
significant change in their stock ownership (i.e., an acquisition
or disposition of stock that causes them to move across the
threshold of 10% ownership or, for a shareholder already above
that threshold, an acquisition of an additional 10% or greater
block of stock in the foreign corporation). 214 This limited group
of shareholders must report the name, address, and identifying
number of all U.S. 10% shareholders of the foreign corporation
along with information regarding the U.S. 10% shareholders'
ownership of stock in the foreign corporation and share of
corporate income subject to current inclusion under the
controlled foreign corporation rules. 215 Even though §§ 6038 and
6046 both employ constructive ownership rules in determining
216
which shareholders are subject to these reporting requirements
and, as mentioned above, attribution rules play an important role
in the operation of the substantive controlled foreign corporation
rules and the rules regarding outbound contributions to the
capital of foreign corporations, no reporting is required with
respect to constructive ownership of any U.S. shareholder of the
foreign corporation. Reporting is required only with respect to
U.S. shareholders who directly or indirectly own 10% or more
(measured by vote or value) of the stock of the foreign
217
corporation.
213Id. § 6038(a), (c)(2).
214Id. § 6046(a)(1)(B); see Treas. Reg. § 1.6046-1(c)(1) (as amended in
2008).
215 Treas. Reg. §§

1.6038-2(a)(2), (0(9) (as amended in 2008),

1.6046-1(b)(14), (c)(3)(i) (as amended in 2008); I.R.S. FORM 5471:
INFORMATION RETURN OF U.S. PERSONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS, at 2 sched. B (2007).
216I.R.C §§ 6038(c)(2), 6046(c).
217 I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 5471, at 5 (2009) [hereinafter FORM
5471 INSTRUCTIONS];

see

I.R.C. § 6046(c) (indicating

that constructive

ownership is to be taken into account only for purposes of § 6046(a)); Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.6038-2(c) (flush language), (0(9) (as amended in 2008) (indicating
that constructive ownership rules apply only for purposes of determining
whether the reporting threshold has been met); 1.6046-1(b)(14), (c)(3)(i) (as
amended in 2008) (speaking in terms of "actual" and "record" owners).
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Moreover, the reporting that does apply to transactions
21 8
between a controlled foreign corporation and related persons
-transactions that underpin a large part of a controlled foreign
corporation's Subpart F income-is triggered only by the
existence of a single controlling U.S. shareholder 2 19 even
though the class of related persons under § 954(d)(3) is not
confined by geography and embraces entities under the common
control of more than one person. 220 Making the reporting gaps
even larger, the form on which this reporting is done does not
contain a separate entry for related person factoring income that
is recharacterized as interest income for purposes of the Subpart
F rules. 221 Furthermore, this reporting requirement is wholly
insufficient with regard to policing the re-sourcing rules for
certain income from U.S.-owned foreign corporations, as the
definition of U.S.-owned foreign corporation in § 904(h)(6) is
even broader than the definition of "controlled foreign
corporation" in the Subpart F rules. 222
5.

Documentation Required

Only a handful of provisions incorporate the § 267 or § 318
attribution rules by reference and actually include an
identification or documentation requirement. For instance, to
obtain the (now expired) first-time homebuyer credit in § 36, a
taxpayer must file Form 5405, which requires the taxpayer to

218

I.R.S.

FORM

5471,

SCHEDULE

M: TRANSACTIONS

BETWEEN

CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS OR OTHER RELATED

PERSONS (2007).
219 See FORM 5471 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 217, at 2 (indicating that
only category 4 fliers arc required to complete Schedule M).

220Trcas. Reg. § 1.954-1

(f) (as amended

in 2002).

221FORM 5471, SCHEDULE M, supra note 218.

222Compare I.R.C. § 904(h)(6), with id. § 957; see I KUNTZ PERONI,
supra note 207, B4.16[17][b][ii]. The forms for claiming the foreign tax credit
appear to do nothing to fill in this gap. See I.R.S. FORM 1116: FOREIGN TAX
CREDIT (INDIVIDUAL, ESTATE, OR TRUST) (2009); I.R.S. FORM 1118: FOREIGN
TAX CREDIT-CORPORATIONS (2009).
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223
certify that her home was not purchased from a related person.
The taxpayer is also required by statute to attach to her return a
copy of the executed settlement statement relating to the
purchase as a prerequisite to obtaining the credit.224 In addition,
the installment sale rules of § 453 contain antiabuse rules
targeted at potentially manipulative sales of property between
related persons. 225 A taxpayer reporting gain on the installment
method must file Form 6252, which contains a section that
specifically addresses related party installment sales. The first
line of this section requires the taxpayer to identify the name,
address, and taxpayer identification number of the related
purchaser of the property.226 And § 103 1(f) contains an antiabuse
rule that is designed to prevent related persons from engaging in
a like-kind exchange in order to shift the basis of properties prior
to an anticipated sale. 227 The IRS requires taxpayers to make
relatively detailed reports regarding such related party
exchanges, including documenting the identity of the related
party to the exchange. 228

B.

Other Attribution Rules

223I.R.C. § 36(c)(3), (5); Homebuyer Assistance and improvement Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-198, § 2, 124 Stat. 1356, 1356 (to be codified at I.R.C.
§ 36); (extending the application of the credit to home purchases completed
before October 1, 2010); I.R.S. FORM 5405: FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER CREDIT
AND REPAYMENT OF THE CREDIT, at I pt. I, I. E (2009).
224I.R.C. § 36(d)(4).
225 Id. § 453(e), (f)(1), (g), (h).

226 I.R.S. FORM 6252: INSTALLMENT SALE INCOME, at I pt. 111, 1,27
(2009). The § 453(0(1) definition of related person also applies in determining
whether a sale of a residential lot by a dealer will qualify for installment sale
reporting, while a different attribution rule applies in determining whether a sale
of a time-share by a dealer will qualify for installment sale reporting. I.R.C.
§ 453(0(2)(B). However, neither, of these rules comes with any special reporting
requirements akin to those that apply to related person sales. See I.R.S. PUB. NO.
537, INSTALLMENT SALES 2 (2009) (simply referring taxpayers to § 453(/) for
further information and mentioning no reporting requirements).

227 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1340 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2810 (explaining the rationale behind the enactment of §
103 1(t)).
228

I.R.S. FORM 8824: LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES, at I pt. 11(2009).
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Though §§ 267 and 318 are the most commonly
encountered attribution rules in the Code, there are a few
provisions with their own unique attribution rules. In this
section, 1 briefly describe these attribution rules and their
attendant identification and documentation requirements (if
any). I first describe generally applicable attribution rules and
then address rules that apply only to married different-sex
couples. The identification and documentation requirements in
these attribution rules share the same haphazard quality as the
family tax provisions discussed in Part I1of this Article.
3.

General Attribution Rules

Section 541 imposes a personal holding company tax on
the undistributed, generally passive income of corporations. As
originally conceived, the personal holding company tax targeted
corporations that functioned as incorporated pocketbooks,
incorporated talents, or incorporated yachts or country estates to
provide their shareholders a means of avoiding taxation at the
(then higher) graduated rates that applied to individuals. 229 To be
classified as a personal holding company, a corporation must
meet both an income test and an ownership test.230 The
ownership test requires that more than 50% of the value of the
2 31
corporation's stock must be held by five or fewer individuals.
For purposes of determining whether this ownership test has
been satisfied, § 544 requires taxpayers to take into account its
own special set of constructive ownership rules. 232 Given the
central importance of the ownership requirement to
229 BORIS

I. BITTKER JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
516532.

7.20 (2009), available at 1999 WL

230I.R.C. § 542(a).

231Id. § 542(a)(2).
232As they relate to family attribution, these constructive ownership rules
also apply for purposes of determining whether a corporation qualifies for the
exceptions from classification as a personal service corporation for certain
lending or finance companies and for certain small business investment
companies. Id. § 542(c)(6)-(7), (d). Naturally, a corporation that qualifies for
these exceptions does not have to undertake the reporting described in the text
below.
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classification as a personal holding company, it should not be
surprising that there is a section of the personal holding
company tax return that requires the corporation to identify the
name and address of each of the shareholders who comprise the
requisite five or fewer individuals who own more than 50% of
the value of its stock.233 Interestingly, this same stock ownership
requirement is incorporated by reference in the at-risk rules of
§ 465 (including a modified version of the constructive
ownership rules), and it there serves the important role of setting
the outside parameters of the class of closely held corporations
subject to those rules. 234 Yet, there is no requirement that
corporate taxpayers document which shareholders cause them to
be subject to the at-risk rules. 235 The same is true of the passive
activity rules, which indirectly borrow the personal holding
company stock ownership requirement by incorporating by
reference the definition of closely held corporation from

§ 465.236
Section 1256 contains mark-to-market rules that require
taxpayers to annually recognize as gain or loss any unrealized
appreciation or depreciation in regulated futures, foreign
currency, and certain other contracts. 237 Hedging transactions
are, however, excepted from this mark-to-market regime "to
ensure that § 1256 does not impede valuable functions served by
the commodity futures markets" to the agricultural and
commercial sectors in reducing the risks associated with the sale
of crops and the bulk purchase of items. 238 Nevertheless, to
prevent manipulation of the hedging exception by tax shelters,
233 I.R.S. FORM 1120, SCHEDULE PH: U.S. PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY
(PHC) TAx, at 2 pt. IV (2009).

234 I.R.C. § 465(a)(I)(B), (3).
235 See FORM 6198, supra note 152.
236 I.R.C. § 469(a)(2), (j)(1); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(g)(2)(ii) (as
amended in 2002); see FORM 8810, supra note 167 (requiring no reporting
regarding the ownership of the corporation).
237 I.R.C. § 1256(a), (b).
238

Id. § 1256(e)(1); BITTKER

available at 1997 WL 439779.

LOKKEN, supra note 123,

57.2.2,
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"syndicates" are made ineligible for the exception. 239 For this
purpose, a "syndicate" is defined as any entity other than a C
corporation if "more than 35 percent of the losses of such entity
during the taxable year are allocable to limited partners or
limited entrepreneurs.

2 40

Individuals who actively participate in

the business and certain relatives of individuals who actively
participate in the business are not classified as limited partners
or limited entrepreneurs

for this purpose. 241

Though

recordkeeping requirements do apply to hedging transactions,
these recordkeeping requirements do not include information
relating either to an entity's qualification as a "syndicate" or to
the application of the rule attributing one person's
active
242
participation in the business to certain of her relatives.
To be eligible to elect treatment as a small business (i.e.,
"S") corporation, a domestic corporation is not permitted to have
more than 100 shareholders.2 43 For purposes of this requirement,
all members of a family are now treated as a single
shareholder. 244 Adding to the generosity of this provision, § 1361
has its own, rather broad definition of family. It includes (1)a
husband and wife and (2) a common ancestor who is up to six
generations removed from the youngest generation of
shareholders who would be members of the family along with
any lineal descendants (and spouses or former spouses of lineal
descendants) of that common ancestor (without any generational

239 I.R.C. § 1256(c)(3)(A); see BITTKER

LOKKEN, supra note 123,

57.2.2, available at 1997 WL 439779.
240

I.R.C. § 1256(c)(3)(B).

241Id.

§ 1256(c)(3)(C).

242 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(t) (as amended in 2007) (containing the
identification and rccordkecping rcquircmcnts for hedging transactions); id. §
1.1256(e)-i (as amended in 2002) (incorporating the identification and
recordkeeping requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(o by reference and
applying them to hedging transactions under § 1256(c)).
243 I.R.C.

§ 1361(b)(I)(A).

244 Id. § 1361(c)(1). Congress expanded this provision beyond only a
husband and wife in 2004. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-357, § 231(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1433.
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limit). 245 When filing an S election, the name and address of
each consenting shareholder must -be included with the
election. 246 If more than 100 shareholders are included on the
list, a box must be checked to indicate that application of the
family attribution rule of § 1361 brings the number of
shareholders below the maximum of 100.247 However, no details
are required concerning which shareholders are related to each
the
other, the exact number of shareholders after application 2of
48
attribution rules, or how the attribution rules were applied.
The so-called kiddie tax is essentially another forn of
attribution rule, as it is designed to prevent parents from
assigning unearned income to their minor children in order to get
a second (or third or fourth) bite at the lower brackets in the
graduated rate schedule.249 The kiddie tax combats this abuse by
effectively attributing the income back to the parent; in other
words, the minor child's unearned income is taxed at the parent's
marginal tax rate. 250 In fact, in some circumstances, the parent
can simply elect to report the minor child's unearned income on
her own tax return. 251 If the kiddie tax applies to a minor child's
unearned income, the child's parent is required to furnish to the
child his/her taxpayer identification number, and the child is
required to include that taxpayer identification number on his/
252
her own return.

245

I.R.C. § 1361(c)(I)(B); Trcas. Rcg. § 1.1361-1(c)(3) (as amended in

2008).
246 I.R.S. FORM

2553: ELECTION

BY A SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATION,

at 2

(2007).
247Id.

at I pt. I, 1.G.

248 Id.; see I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 2553 (2007) (making no
mention of any reporting requirements).
249 I.R.C. § (g); see BIrTKER
available at 1997 WL 440072.

250 I.R.C. § I(g)(I), (3), (4).

211Id. § I(g)(7).
2521Id. § I(g)(6).

LOKKEN, supra note 123,

111.3.8,
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Assignment of income concerns are also the impetus
behind § 704(e), which deals with family partnerships. Under
§ 704(e)(1), a person will be recognized as a partner in a
partnership in which capital is a material income-producing
factor, no matter whether that person's partnership interest was
acquired by purchase or by gift. If a partnership interest is
created by gift, then § 704(e)(2) requires that an allocation be
made to the donor in an amount equal to reasonable
compensation for any services that the donor renders to the
partnership. 253 Section 704(e)(2) further requires that the donee's
distributive share of partnership income not be proportionately
greater than the donor's distributive share with respect to the
donor's own contributed capital. 254 For this purpose, a purchase
of a partnership interest between family members is
recharacterized as a gift, and the fair market value of the
purchased interest-is treated as donated capital. 2 55 Nevertheless,
neither Form 1065 nor the accompanying instructions make any
mention of family partnerships, let alone request any
information regarding one family member's acquisition of a
partnership interest from another. 256
4.

Spousal Attribution Rules

There are several attribution rules that apply just to
spouses. For example, the first-time homebuyer credit in § 36
(discussed above) is available only to taxpayers who are at least
eighteen years of age at the time of purchase. 257 If two
unmarried individuals purchase a home and only one meets the
age requirement at the time of purchase, they may allocate the
first-time homebuyer credit only to the individual who meets the
age requirement and only she will be permitted to claim any part

253Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(3)(i)(a)-(b) (as amended in 2008).
254Id.

255I.R.C. § 704(c)(3).
256 See generally FORM 1065, supra note 197; FORM 1065 INSTRUCTIONS,

supra note 197.
257I.R.C. § 36(b)(4). On the expiration of this credit, see supra note 223.
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of the credit. 258 If, however, these same two individuals are
married, then one spouse's satisfaction of the age requirement
spouse, and they both will be
will be attributed to the other
259
permitted to claim the credit.
In addition, § 121 permits a taxpayer to exclude from gross
income up to $250,000 of the gain on the sale of a principal
residence, provided, however, that the taxpayer meets certain
ownership and use requirements and does not claim the
exclusion more than once every two years. In the case of married
different-sex couples, § 121 provides a variety of rules that
attribute the ownership or use of the property from one spouse to
the other so that they can qualify for the exclusion, including a
rule that doubles the amount of the exclusion even where the
spouses could not each independently qualify for a full
exclusion. 260 Notably, if a taxpayer qualifies for the exclusion,
there is no need for the taxpayer to report the sale to the IRS,
unless the taxpayer recognizes gain in excess of the permissible
exclusion. 261 Similarly, for purposes of the passive activity
limitations of § 469, the participation of each spouse in an
activity is attributed to the other in determining whether they
qualify for either the general exception for material participation
in any trade or business activity or the limited exception for
active participation in a rental real estate activity.262
To close the door to potential abuse, for purposes of the
Code's grantor trust rules, the grantor of a trust is treated as
holding any power or interest held by an individual who was
either her spouse at the time the power or interest was created or

25 Id. § 36(b)(1)(C); I.R.S. Notice 2009-12, 2009-1 C.B. 446.
259I.R.C. § 36(b)(4).
260

Id. § 121(b)(2), (b)(4), (b)(5)(C), (d)(l)-(3); see I.R.S. PUB. No. 523,

SELLING YOUR HOME 14 (2009) (containing a separate section describing all of
the special rules that apply to married different-sex couples).
261

I.R.S. PUB. NO. 523, supra note 260, at 19.

262 I.R.C. § 469(h)(5), (i)(6)(D); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(0(3) (as

amended in 1996).
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became her spouse after the power or interest was created. 263
Though some form of reporting with regard to grantor trust
income is contemplated (either by the trust or by the payer of the
income), no reporting is required regarding the reason why a
trust is treated as a grantor trust or 264
the attribution of a power or
interest from one spouse to another.
Section 1014(e) is designed to stymie attempts to obtain an
artificial step-up in the basis of property by temporarily gifting
the property to someone who is about to die in order to obtain a
new fair market value basis in the property when the donee dies
and passes the property back to the donor. Section 1014(e)
disqualifies property from receiving a stepped-up basis
regardless of whether the donee/decedent passes the property
back to the original donor or to the donor's spouse, effectively
attributing the spouse's ownership of the property to the donor
herself.265 However, no one is required to notify the IRS when a
transfer of property runs afoul of the antiabuse rule in § 10 14(e).
Section 1092 contains loss deferral rules that apply to
"straddles"-that is, two offsetting positions in the same or
similar actively traded property (e.g., a contract or option to buy
266
property and a contract or option to sell that same property).
Prior to the enactment of § 1092, straddles were marketed as a
tax shelter that could provide taxpayers with the opportunity to
defer the recognition of income and, eventually, to convert
ordinary income into long-term capital gain by exiting the
offsetting positions in different taxable years. 267 In determining
whether the taxpayer has entered into offsetting positions, the
263

1.R.C.

§ 672(e);

see ROBERT T. DANFORTH ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME

7.10 (2010), available at 2000 WL
1772582 (explaining the impetus for enacting this provision).

TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS

264 Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4 (as amended in 2006):
265

I.R.C. § 1014(e)(1)(B), (2)(B).

266

See id. § 1092(c)(2)(A) (defining "offsetting"), (d)(2) (defining

"position").
267 See BITTKER LOKKEN, supra note 123,
57.6.1, -.6.6, available at
1997 WL 439783 (describing how the widespread promotion of straddles as a
form of tax shelter led to the enactment of these loss deferral rules).
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taxpayer is treated as holding any position in property that is
held by the taxpayer's spouse. 268 To facilitate the enforcement of
these antiabuse rules, taxpayers are required to identify any
unrecognized gain from positions held on the last day of the
taxable year, provided that the taxpayer has a recognized loss on
a position during the taxable year. 269 Though the instructions to
the relevant tax form admonish taxpayers to report both
positions that they hold as well as positions that related persons
hold, the form requires no disclosure of whether a position is
held by the taxpayer or by.a related person (here, the taxpayer's
spouse). 270 Similarly, for purposes of the portions of § 1233 that
address the consequences of tax-oriented short sales of property,
a husband and wife are treated as a single taxpayer, meaning that
their short sales and holdings of substantially identical property
2 71
are considered together in applying these antiabuse rules.
Again, however, no reporting of the
attribution of property from
272
one spouse to the other is required.
The original issue discount rules, which identify and
determine the timing of the interest component in lending
transactions, contain an exemption for loans under S10,000
between natural persons. 273 For purposes of determining whether
their loans exceed the $10,000 threshold, a husband and wife are
treated as one person, which means that all loans made by them
to the same person must be consolidated. 274 Though the statutory
language is susceptible of a broader interpretation, the
regulations clarify that a husband and wife are not treated as one
268 I.R.C.
269

§ 1092(d)(4)(A)-(B)(i).

Id. § 1092(a)(3)(C); I.R.S.

FORM 6781: GAINS AND LOSSES FROM

SECTION 1256 CONTRACTS AND STRADDLES, atIpt.

111
(2009); id. at 4.

270 FORM 6781, supra note 269, at I pt.
111
(2009).
271I.R.C. § 1233(c)(2)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.1233-1(d)(3) (as amended in
1980).
272 See SCHEDULED INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 173, at D-4 (making no
mention of reporting requirements).

273I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(E).
274

Id. § 1272(a)(2)(E)(iii).
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person with regard to loans that they make to each other; in other
words, loans between a husband and wife are not disregarded for
this purpose and those loans must also not exceed the $10,000
threshold to qualify for this exemption. 275 Notably, interest and
original issue discount on a debt issued by a natural person are
276
exempt from information reporting.
C. Recapitulation
The picture painted by the attribution rules is something of
a mirror image of the picture painted by the provisions discussed
in Part 11 of this Article. Far from adopting a baseline of
identification and documentation, the provisions incorporating
the § 267 or § 318 attribution rules largely eschew identification
and documentation of the familial relationships that trigger their
application. Only a relative handful of the provisions
incorporating the § 267 or § 318 attribution rules impose any
sort of identification or documentation requirement. The small
number of other attribution rules in the Code-some of which
embrace identification and documentation requirements and
others of which do not-echo the haphazard, uncoordinated
quality of the family tax provisions discussed in Part 11. Thus,
the picture painted by the attribution rules only lends further
support for the notion that the interconnecting lines of
subordination that we will trace next are the product of endemic
privilegings-that is, privilegings that have become so normal,
so ingrained in our nature, such a part of our "world-view" that
they manifest themselves without the conscious thought of
legislators or regulators.
D.

Resection

To begin the task of tracing the interconnecting lines of
subordination in the administrative structure underpinning the
family tax provisions in the Code, let us first revisit the baselines
established in each of the three parts of this Article. From that
vantage point, it will be easier to detect the point from which
this web of subordination radiates.
275

Trcas. Reg. § I. 1272-I (a)(2) (as amended in 1998).

276 I.R.C. § 6049(b)(2)(A); Treas. Reg.

2006).

§ 1.6049-5(b)(1)

(as amended in
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In the previous two parts of this Article, identification and
documentation of family members was the baseline. In Part I, we
considered the information-reporting requirements that apply to
jointly held property that produces interest, dividends, or
royalties. There, the general instructions' nominee/middleman
reporting rule created a baseline of identification. The confusion
in that area stemmed from the conflict among the regulations
and between the regulations and the general instructions
regarding the situations in which taxpayers will be exempt from
nominee/middleman reporting. Recall that the only exception
from reporting in the general instructions applies to married
different-sex spouses. No rationale has been offered for this
exception or for the general instructions' complete disregard of
the more generous-and more sensible-exception that
ostensibly applies to dividend reporting. The exception in the
general instructions introduces inequality into the enforcement
of the tax laws and bears the marks of having been influenced by
the (expected) privileging of different-sex marriage in our tax
laws. But this inequality in enforcement and further
entrenchment of the privileging of marriage in our tax laws only
arises because an exception has been carved out from a baseline
of identification and documentation.
Then, in Part II, we examined the deductions, credits, and
exclusions that are provided (or, conversely, denied) to a
taxpayer with respect to her family members. Form 1040 and
§ 151(e) worked in tandem there to create a baseline of
identification and documentation of family members. With
respect to spousal relationships, recall that the Form 1040
requires married different-sex spouses to identify and document
their relationship with each other, whether they file one return
jointly or two returns separately. 277 With respect to other family
members, recall that § 15 1(e) requires a taxpayer to identify and
document all of her dependents. 278 The sense of haphazardness
that grew out of the discussion in Part 1Istemmed not from these
provisions, but from the filled, unfilled, and overfilled gaps
between the baseline that they create and the other provisions

277

See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.

278 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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that afford (or deny) a taxpayer benefits with respect to her
family members.
Juxtaposing the discussion in this Part with the previous
two, it is clear that the baseline in the attribution rules is not to
require the identification and documentation of family members.
Here, the longest list of provisions-some sixty in all-is
composed of those with no identification or documentation
requirements. There was a small group of other provisions with
limited identification and documentation requirements, but that
mandated no significant reporting regarding the relationships
that give rise to attribution. In contrast, there was a relative
dearth of provisions that actually require identification and
documentation of family members. This breakdown of the
attribution rules provides ample evidence in support of the
conclusion that the baseline in those rules is not to require
taxpayers to identify or document their family members.
A comparison of these baselines reveals even further
entrenchment of endemic privilegings. As discussed in Part I, the
privileging of marriage in the information-reporting rules builds
upon the foundation of a class-based privileging that subjects
wealthy taxpayers to a less effective and less intrusive method of
enforcement with respect to their investment income than is
imposed upon those who earn their income from paid labor. The
establishment of a baseline in the attribution rules of not
requiring identification and documentation of family members
serves to cement this class-based privileging into place.
This point is best illustrated by first considering the
incidence of the rules discussed in Parts l1 and III of this Article.
On one hand, the attribution rules discussed in Part III are
premised on the idea of the family as an economic unit and
generally treat the members of that unit as sharing the ownership
of property (or, at the very least, as being indifferent to the
allocation of legal ownership of property within the unit). Those
with greater wealth are, quite naturally, more likely to be subject
to such rules because they possess more property the ownership
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of which can be attributed to others. 279 On the other hand, the
deductions, credits, and exclusions discussed in Part I are, at a
general level, much more broadly applicable. Those rules afford
(or deny) tax benefits based on familial relationships and,
therefore, do not presuppose a certain level of property
ownership. Instead, the rules discussed in Part 1I contemplate no
more than the possibility of a taxpayer being born into a family,
having friends, and marrying (but only someone different-sex).
Turning to their specific operation, the provisions discussed in
Part II are, if anything, skewed toward lower- and middleincome taxpayers. For instance, the amount of the dependent
care assistance credit is reduced as a taxpayer's income
increases; taxpayers with income above a ceiling amount are
ineligible for the educational loan interest deduction; and the
qualified tuition deduction, the exclusion for interest on U.S.
savings bonds used to pay higher education expenses, the
contribution limit for a Coverdell ESA, the child tax credit, the
hope credit, the lifetime learning credit, the American

279 In 2008, fully 84% of the taxable net gain from capital assets on Form
1040, Schedule D was reported by the 3% of taxpayers with adjusted gross
incomes of $200,000 or more. I.R.S. PUB. No. 1304, supra note 27, at 42 tbl. 1.4.

A major complaint made by some about lower gains rates
cut is that they primarily benefit very high income
individuals. Capital gains arc concentrated among higher
income individuals because these individuals tend to own
capital and because they are likely to own capital that
generates capital gains. For example, the Joint Committee
on Taxation indicated that for 2005, 88% of the bcnefit of
lower rates [sic] to individuals with incomes over
$200,000 and 95% would go to individuals with incomes
over $100,000. Individuals with $200,000 of income
account for about 3% of taxpayers and individuals with
incomes over $100,000 account for less [sic] about 14%.
JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG.

RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., REP. No.

96-769, CAPITAL GAINS TAXES: AN OVERVIEW, at CRS-6 (2007); see also Who
Pays Capital Gains Taxes?, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, (Mar. 16, 2006), http://
www.ctj.org/pdf/cg0306.pdf (indicating that, in 2005, "the wealthiest 10 percent
of taxpayers enjoyed 90 percent of the capital gains eligible" for preferential
rates, while "the poorest sixty percent of Americans, by contrast, collectively
received just 2 percent of the capital gains eligible for the lower capital gains
rates").
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opportunity credit, and the earned income credit are all reduced
and eventually phased out as a taxpayer's income increases.280
Now let us superimpose the incidence of these rules over
their respective baselines. The attribution rules tend to apply to
wealthy taxpayers and generally do not require them to identify
or document their family members. This lack of accountability
opens the door to potential abuse, because wealthy taxpayers can
carelessly or erroneously apply the attribution rules and then
play the audit lottery in the hopes that the IRS will never detect
an error. The deduction, credit, and exclusion provisions that
afford (or deny) tax benefits based on familial relationships are
more widely available and, to the extent they bespeak any
targeting based on economic class, are targeted at lower- and
middle-income taxpayers. These lower- and middle-income
taxpayers, unlike their wealthy counterparts, are generally
required to identify and document their family members, in an
effort to increase their tax compliance and reduce the possibility
that they might abuse the Code. Thus, once considered together,
the rules in Parts 11 and III provide evidence of class-based
privileging in the identification and documentation of family
members for tax purposes, with greater enforcement effort being

280 I.R.C. §§ 21(a)(2), 24(b)(I)-(2), 25A(d), (i)(4), 32(a)(2), (b), 135(b)
(2), 221 (b)(2), 222(b), 530(c).
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and lesser
directed toward lower- and middle-income taxpayers
2 81
enforcement effort being directed at the wealthy.
And it cannot be said that the wealthy require lesser
enforcement effort because we can repose greater trust in them
to report correctly. The IRS found that, for tax year 2001, over
70% of the federal tax gap (i.e., the difference between taxes
owed and taxes paid) was attributable to the individual income
tax and that over 80% of the tax gap was attributable to
281An anonymous reviewer of this Article suggested that the difference in
treatment between the provisions discussed in Parts II and Ill of this Article
might be explained by the fact that the provisions discussed in Part II concern
commonplace transactions or involve third parties who can easily report
information to the IRS whereas the provisions discussed in Part Ill concern
extraordinary, abusive transactions that are sophisticated in nature and require
the use of tax professionals whom we can trust to safeguard the integrity of the
tax system.

This suggested explanation, though a convenient justification of the status
quo, is quite simply implausible. It is not true that most of the provisions
discussed in Part II concern extraordinary or abusive transactions. First, as
discussed at the beginning of Part 111,attribution rules are sometimes used not to
prevent abuse, but to confer a benefit on taxpayers even where the ownership of
property is dispersed among family members. For example, § 136 1(c) contains a
beneficial attribution rule for purposes of determining which corporations can
make a Subchapter S election, § 121(b)(4) and (5) contain beneficial attribution
rules for spouses in determining their qualification for the exclusion from gross
income for gain on the sale of a principal residence, and § 354(a)(2)(C) contains
an exception from the general rule treating nonqualified preferred stock as boot
if that stock is used in the recapitalization of a family-owned corporation.
In addition, whether these transactions are everyday or extraordinary
depends very much on one's perspective-and we should be sure to view the
provisions in Part 11and Part II from the same perspective before classifying
one group as commonplace and the other as extraordinary. As the anonymous
reviewer contends, abuse of the employee fringe benefits rules in § 132, of § 179
expensing, or of the § 221 educational loan interest deduction (all discussed in
Part Ill) may not be an everyday event for taxpayers. But, then, abuse of the
provisions discussed in Part II may not be an everyday event for taxpayers either.
Nevertheless, the provision and receipt of employee benefits, the purchase of
equipment by small businesses, and the borrowing of educational loans are
everyday transactions, just as the purchase of health insurance, the payment of
medical expenses, and the payment of moving expenses (all discussed in Part II)
are. In determining the tax consequences of these everyday transactions, the
attribution rules, no more and no less than the provisions discussed in Part 11,
have the function of delineating the scope of a given tax provision where the
relevant group for purposes of that provision includes not only the taxpayer
herself but also family members.
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underreporting (i.e., understating income or overstating
deductions or credits). 282 The Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC) has found that:
[N]o other class of individual tax returns
comes close [to millionaires] in terms of the
size of the underreporting errors. [In 2008], for
example, the average IRS audit of the
millionaire class of taxpayers resulted in agent
recommendation of just under $200,000 in
additional taxes for each return. Even for the
much less intensive correspondence audit
contacts-which from start to finish typically
require only a little over two hours to complete
-the auditor recommendations for additional
taxes averaged over $136,000 per
return .... 283
OMB Watch has thus observed that "[t]he high yields on face-toface audits of high-income filers show both that they are a good
investment and also that there are significantly more taxes due

Moreover, regardless of frequency of occurrence, the point of imposing
reporting and documentation requirements on these transactions is to increase
taxpayer compliance and ensure that only those targeted by a provision are
actually subject to it. This holds true with respect to all of the provisions
discussed in both Part 11and Part I11.As discussed in the text immediately below,
to pretend that we can simply rely on wealthy taxpayers' advisers to weed out
abuse and ensure compliance is, at best, wishful thinking and, at worst, a
complete disregard of reality. See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut:
Surveying Erosion in the Prvfessionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589
(2003) (discussing abusive transactions in which tax professionals have been
involved and the failure of the tax bar to police its own); Richard Lavoic,
Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate
Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43 (2001) (discussing the pressure on the tax bar
to participate in tax shelter activity).
282 OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE

STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 5 (2006), available at http:/l
www.treasury.gov/press-centcr/press-releases/Documcnts/otptaxgapstratcgy
%20final.pdf.
283 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, TRAC Says IRS Audit
Ratefor Wealthy "Sharply Declined," 2009 TNT 53-77 (LEXIS).
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among those filers. ' ' 284 More generally, OMB Watch has noted

that:
[T]he tax gap creates a patently perverse set of
winners and losers-taxpayers who do not
follow the law benefit and taxpayers who do
lose out. Larger burdens also tend to fall on
lower- and middle-income taxpayers, whose
compliance rates are higher than other income
levels. Higher-income taxpayers, small
business owners, and corporations are the
main beneficiaries, as their compliance rates
are lower. Because of this, on the whole, the
tax gap makes the tax code less progressive
than the statutory structure indicates, though
by exactly how much has not been
quantified. 285
Yet, this is not an isolated instance of class-based
privileging in the enforcement of the tax laws. As mentioned
above, though the information-reporting rules discussed in Part I
establish an ostensibly strict baseline of requiring the
identification and documentation of family members, these rules
already represent a downward departure from the even more
286
stringent baseline of the withholding tax that applies to wages.
In other words, what appears to be greater enforcement effort in
the reporting of investment income paradoxically represents the
application of more lax enforcement measures to collect that
income. In addition, an analysis of IRS audits by TRAC revealed
that, in 2005, low-income taxpayers were six times more likely
to be subject to a face-to-face audit than wealthy taxpayers and

284 OMB WATCH, BRIDGING THE TAX GAP: THE CASE FOR INCREASING

THE IRS BUDGET 10 (2008), 2008 TNT 11-29 (LEXIS).
285Id. at 4.
216 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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were twice as likely to be subject to the more common
correspondence audit.2 87 As the TRAC report further explains:
It is not known whether the very low rate of
face-to-face audits for millionaires reported in
FY 2005-less than 2 out of 10,000-is new
or whether the policy has been followed in
previous years. This is because the IRS has
never before provided information about the
number of audits for various categories of
wealthier taxpayers-$100,000 to $200,000,
$200,000 to $1 million, and Si million and
above. However, there have been other years
when analysis has shown that in broad terms
low-income individuals were more likely to be
audited than rich. One of those occasions was
in FY 1999 during the Clinton Administration.
A factor contributing to this anomaly was an
order from Congress that the IRS reduce noncompliance in the Earned Income Credit
program, a 288
special tax benefit for low-income
Americans.
Furthermore, despite a professed intention to focus increased
scrutiny on wealthy taxpayers, the audit rate for those with an
adjusted gross income of at least $1 million dropped by at least
19% (and possibly as much as 36%) from 2007 to 2008.289 It
was not until 2010 that the IRS reported a marked increase in
audits of returns reporting the highest adjusted gross incomesthough, it is worth noting that the rate of audit for nearly all
2 90
other categories of adjusted gross income increased as well.
Nevertheless, as TRAC observed:
287 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, TRAC

Finds Lower IRS

Audit Rate for Wealthy Than for Low-Income Taxpayers, 2006 TNT 60-37

(LEXIS).
288 ld.

289 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 283.
298 Compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, DATA

BOOK: 2009, at 26 tbl.9b (2010), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF
TREASURY, DATA BOOK: 2010, at 26 tbl.9b (2011).
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IRS's statistics indicate that 1 out of every 12
individuals with total positive income of $1
million or more were audited through . . .
regular programs during FY 2010. While the
number of these examinations was up [that]
year, this still left the returns of 11 out of 12
millionaires unexamined. And it should be
noted, that of those audited about half received
a very limited correspondence review on
which the examiner spent just 1.8 hours on

average to complete. 291
Again, such class-based privilegings entail their own disparate
impacts along lines of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
and marital status due to, among other things, wage
discrimination on these bases that detrimentally affects the
ability to accumulate wealth. 292 A recent study found that,
notwithstanding the widespread myth of LGBT affluence, there
is a significant level of poverty in the lesbian, gay, and bisexual
community. 293 In particular, "lesbian couples are at a
significantly higher risk of being in poverty than their different2' 94
sex couple counterparts who have the same characteristics.

291 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, TRAC Says IRS High
Wealth Taxpayer Program Failed to Meet Audit Targets, 2011 TNT 73-43
(LEXIS). This same report focuses on the IRS's "special new unit to examine
'high wealth individuals' and the extent to which they were complying with the
tax laws." Id. TRAC reports that this unit has only "managed to audit a handful
of tax returns in its first 18 months." Id. Notwithstanding that "the IRS has very
modest hopes for this new unit in FY 2011," the unit is already falling short of
those limited targets in the first six months of the fiscal year. id.
292See supranote 61.
293 RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN,

GAY, AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY

7 (2009),

available

at http://

williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-dcmographics-studics/
poverty-in-the-lesbian-gay-and-bisexual-community/. Among the factors
potentially contributing to the increased risk of povcrty for LGBT individuals are
employment discrimination, lesser access to structures such as marriage that
enhance a family's economic position, lesser access to health insurance
coverage, lower likelihood of receiving family support, and higher likelihood of
homelessness among LGBT youth. Id. at 1.
294

1d. at 12.
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Moreover, despite having other characteristics that tend to
reduce their risk of poverty (e.g., "lower rates of childrearing, a
greater likelihood of being white, higher education levels, and,
of course, being male"), gay couples "'are more likely to be poor
than are married couples, with adjusted poverty rates
almost one
295
percentage point higher than for married couples.'
A recent study by the Transgender Law Center found that
transgender Californians were twice as likely as the average
296
Californian to report wages below the national poverty level.
Notably, this far higher risk of poverty for transgender
Californians was prevalent in a group of respondents who
reported both relatively higher rates of labor force participation
and higher levels of education. 297 In fact, transgender
Californians with bachelor's degrees reported income 40% lower
than the average college graduate in California. 298 In terms of
assets, the transgender Californians who responded to this
survey reported limited assets, with 67% of all of the
respondents reporting no financial assets beyond a savings
account. Among the African-American and Latino/a
respondents, even higher numbers reported no retirement or
investment accounts (91% and 78%, respectively). 299 The rates
of transgender homeownership were also markedly below the
average. Only 20% of the survey respondents owned a home,
compared to the state average of 56%.300
Moreover, as this report from the Transgender Law Center
suggests, class and other axes of subordination do not merely
overlap, with a disproportionate number of individuals from
2951(.
296TRANSGENDeR LAW CTR., THE STATE OF TRANSGENDER CALIFORNIA:
RESULTS FROM THE 2008 CALIFORNIA TRANSGENDER ECONOMIC HEALTH
SURVEY 7 (2009), available at http://transgendcrlawcentcr.org/pdt
StateTransCA rcport 2009Print.pdf.
297Id.
298

Id.

2991d. at 8.
300 M.
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'these groups populating the lower rungs of the economic ladder.
Rather, the intersection of these axes of subordination can result
in a compounding of the class-based privileging in the
attribution rules. For example, "recent data for the US suggests
that the largest gender wealth gap is found at the very top of the
wealth distribution. ' 30 1 Similarly, African-American households
exhibit both an internal stratification of wealth by class 30 2 and an
external stratification of wealth vis- -vis their white
counterparts:
The data are very convincing in one simple
respect: differences in observed income levels
are not nearly sufficient to explain the large
racial wealth gap . . . . The black-to-white
wealth ratio comes closest to equality among
prosperous households earning $50,000 or
more. Even here where the wealth gap is
narrowest, however, blacks possess barely
one-half (0.52) the median net worth of their
high-earning white counterparts. For net
financial assets, the mean ratio.., ranges from
0.006 to 0.33. The highest earning black
households possess twenty-three cents of
median net financial assets for every dollar
held by high-income white households. One
startling comparison reveals that poverty-level
whites control nearly as many mean net
financial assets as the highest-earning blacks,
$26,683 to $28,310. . . . Blacks and whites
with equal incomes possess very unequal
shares of wealth. More so than income, wealth
holding remains very sensitive to the
30 3
historically sedimenting effects of race.
Consequently, the class-based privileging in the enforcement of
the attribution rules promises far more potential benefit to highincome white households than to high-income African-American
301 Deere Doss, supra note 61, at 3.
302OLIVER SHAPIRO, supra note 61, at 74-75.
303

Id.
at 10 1.
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households. Indeed, extrapolating from the conclusions of this
study, high-income African-American households should only
be as likely to benefit from the lax enforcement of the attribution
rules as the poorest of white households.
By now, it should be apparent that, even though Congress
and the IRS have not taken a deliberative approach when
imposing identification and documentation requirements,
endemic privilegings along multiple axes of subordination have
subtly influenced decisions regarding whether or not to impose
such requirements as a means of enforcing the Code's family tax
provisions. As noted in the introduction to this Article, these
endemic privilegings-and the resulting lines of subordination
that they embed in the administrative structure of the Code's
family tax provisions-are entirely consistent with the
Gramscian notion of hegemony, which posits that the dominant
group in society maintains control not only through force but
also through control of the flow of ideas. 304 These endemic
privilegings have come to feel so normal and natural that they
have permeated the administrative structure underpinning the
family tax provisions in a way that has, until now, completely
escaped notice. Gramsci's work thus nicely dovetails with a
critical tax perspective, as both acknowledge that "domination is
often subtle, invisible, and consensual. '' 30 5 For this very reason,
this Article began (and now ends) by explicitly drawing upon
Gramsci's work on hegemony.
Having recognized the hegemonic qualities of the
administrative structure underpinning the Code's family tax
provisions, we can now turn to the concluding section of this
Article. The conclusion outlines a proposal to redress the
unconscious discrimination embedded in the administrative
structure underpinning the family tax provisions in the Code.
CONCLUSION
Family is important for tax purposes. However, the extent
to which taxpayers are required to identify and document the

304See supra tcxt accompanying note
305

See Litowitz, supra note 14, at 5 19.
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role that their family members play in their tax calculations
varies widely and, seemingly, without reason. Too often, this
variation appears to be influenced by endemic privilegings along
the lines of class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and
marital status.
Drawing on a comparative perspective, Professor Lily
Kahng has advocated adopting "fairness and equality as
fundamental policy goals in designing and evaluating the
enforcement mechanisms of any tax system." 30 6 In keeping with
Professor Kahng's suggestion, it is time to bring not only order,
but also fairness and equality to the enforcement of the Code's
family tax provisions. Elsewhere, I have argued in favor of
adopting an individual tax filing regime that would allow
individuals to choose their family for tax purposes and that
would require both increased and more evenhanded reporting
regarding a taxpayer's familial relationships. 30 7 Short of such a
major restructuring of the Code's family tax provisions,
Congress and the IRS should take a more deliberative approach
to determining when (and, if so, how) taxpayers should be
required to identify and document their family members.
As a first step toward increasing taxpayer compliance and
striving for more evenhanded enforcement of the tax laws, the
same baseline of identifying and documenting family members
should be applied to all of the family tax provisions in the Code,
including the attribution rules. There is absolutely no reason why
the attribution rules should, as a group, be treated differently
from the information-reporting rules examined in Part I of this
Article or the deductions, credits, and exclusions examined in
Part 11 of this Article. The attribution rules are a part of the
substantive tax rules that taxpayers' must apply in detennining
their tax liability. To require identification and documentation of
family members when the attribution rules apply to a taxpayer is
to require nothing more than for the taxpayer to explain how she
applied the substantive tax law to her individual situation so that
the IRS can more effectively and efficiently police taxpayer
compliance.
306 Kahng, Investment Income Withholding, supra note 13, at 338.
307 Infanti, supra note 46.
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In other words, taxpayers should be required to "show their
work" when filing their returns, whether on a form designed for
this purpose or on an attachment to the return created by the
taxpayer herself. The IRS already asks low-income taxpayers to
do just this when claiming the earned income credit. A taxpayer
claiming the earned income credit with respect to a qualifying
child must complete a separate Schedule EIC that requires the
taxpayer to identify and document all claimed children and to
perform a step-by-step analysis to determine whether those
children are "qualifying" children for earned income credit
purposes. 308 If low-income taxpayers can be asked to show their
work when navigating the complexities of the earned income
credit, why not ask wealthier (and generally better-advised)
taxpayers to do the same?
Accordingly, with regard to the attribution rules, taxpayers
should be required to list all related individuals or entities and
explain how their ownership of property (or other relevant
attributes) factored into the application of the tax laws to the
taxpayer's specific factual situation. There would be no need for
the taxpayer to prove a negative when filing the return (e.g.,
there would be no need to provide unequivocal proof that the
seller is unrelated to the purchaser of a loss property in order to
avoid the disallowance rule in § 267(a)(1)). The explanation of
the return position would put the IRS on notice of both the
relevance of the attribution rules to a return position and the
rationale for that return position. The IRS could then better
assess whether the taxpayer's position bears further scrutiny on
audit, when a request for proof in support of a return position
might be appropriate. In addition, by requiring affirmative
disclosure of familial and other relationships as well as an
explanation of how those relationships affected the application
of the substantive tax laws to the taxpayer's situation, the
taxpayer would find it difficult either (1) to ignore the attribution
rules altogether in the hope of winning the audit lottery and
escaping scrutiny or (2) to invent post-hoc rationalizations for
false or erroneous return positions. Conversely, the IRS would
more easily be able to detect faulty or suspect legal analyses that
bear further scrutiny on audit.

308

I.R.S.

FORM 1040, SCHEDULE EIC: EARNED INCOME CREDIT (2009).
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It is worth underscoring that the taxpayer (or, more likely,
her tax advisor) must already perform this legal analysis prior to
completing and filing the tax return. At present, we simply do
not require the taxpayer to explain on her return how that
analysis was performed. That the attribution rules can be
complex and convoluted is no more of a reason to excuse the
taxpayer from explaining herself than it apparently is for
excusing low-income taxpayers from explaining the application
of the earned income credit to their specific situations. If the
attribution rules are too complex for taxpayers to apply, then this
calls for changes to be made to the substantive tax laws and not
for the creation of disparities in the enforcement of the tax
laws. 30 9 Moreover, this argument ignores the burdens created by
the de facto documentation requirement in § 15 1(e), which can
entail much more than simply listing a name, Social Security
number, and relationship on the Form 1040.
In fact, when it was initially enacted, the requirement to
identify and document dependents gave some in Congress great
pause:
Finally, I must express my concern as to how
the authors of this amendment propose to pay
for partial restoration of the sales tax
[deduction]. The amendment would require
that children age 4 or older register with the
Social Security system and obtain a Social
Security number in order for their parents to
claim a dependent deduction for them. I
recognize that this so-called "compliance"
measure will deter people from claiming
dependent deductions for phantom children.
However, I wonder if this will not be
perceived by our Nation's citizens as just one
309 Cf Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 790, 828-30 (2007) (asserting that, once it is understood that
earned income credit recipients are white, the movement for simplification of the
earned income credit will take hold); Francine J. Lipman, The Working PoorAre
Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse,
2003 Wis. L. REV. 461, 476-97 (proposing a variety of solutions to address the
complexity of the earned income credit).
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more step in the direction of Big Brother
government from Washington. Registering
with Social Security has always been a right of
passage for young people entering the work
force for the first time. Receipt of the card has
always meant that a citizen has joined the
social insurance program and has become a
contributor to that system, and an ultimate
beneficiary of that system. Today, when the
promise of a Social Security is severely in
doubt for many of today's young workers, it
seems ironic to require infants to sign up to
help the IRS enforce the tax laws.
Yet by the action we take today if we adopt
this amendment, a Social Security card is
being transformed into a forn- of National
Identity Card. In the past, there has been a
heated debate as to whether it would infringe
individual liberties and the right to privacy to
institute a National Identity Card. Often the
debate has centered around the problem of
illegal aliens in the work force. So far, we
have rejected the idea of instituting such an
identification system. 310
This sea change in the approach to obtaining Social Security
numbers also created a significant burden for parents. To obtain
a Social Security number for a child, parents must compile
documents establishing their child's U.S. citizenship, age, and
311
identity as well as documents proving their own citizenship.
310 132 CONG. REC. S7892-02 (daily ed. June 19, 1986) (remarks of Sen.
Durenberger).
311The

process for obtaining an original Social Security card is described

on the Social Security Administration web site. See Request a Social Security
Numberfor a Baby, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answcrs/

detail/a id/237 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011 ). From there, one can link to a
description of acceptable forms ofdocumentation that will satisfy each of these
requirements. The Social Security Administration warns on this web page that it
takes up to twelve weeks longer to request a card after a child's birth than it does
to apply through the enumeration at birth program discussed in the text
immediately below. id.
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These documents and the appropriate Social Security
Administration (SSA) form must either be mailed or personally
brought to the local SSA office for processing. In 1990, at least
in part in response to increased demand for Social Security
numbers following the enactment of the predecessor of § 151 (e),
the SSA established its enumeration at birth program, which
permits parents to request a Social Security number at the time
of a child's birth. 312 To administer this program, the SSA must
contract with the relevant vital statistics agency in each state, the
District of Columbia, and New York City so that the agency can
transmit the required information to SSA and SSA can, in turn,
issue a Social Security number to the child and furnish it to the
child's parents. 313 SSA has estimated that only about 75% of
newborns receive their Social Security numbers through its
enumeration at birth program.3 14 Keep in mind that the burden §
151(e) imposes on parents and SSA is entirely related to tax
compliance-unlike the attribution rules, which are part of the
substantive tax laws.
In keeping with this move toward a uniform baseline of
reporting, Congress should take steps to address the hodgepodge
of explicit, de facto, and duplicative identification and
documentation requirements described in Part 1I of this Article.
As discussed at length above, the current, rather haphazard
approach to administering the family tax provisions covered in
Part II leaves some compliance gaps filled, others unfilled, and
yet others overfilled. Congress could easily remedy this problem
by moving the de facto identification and documentation
requirement in § 151(e) into § 152, which contains the core
definition of dependent that is incorporated by reference in so
many other Code sections. The identification and documentation
requirement could then be altered to apply to anyone whom the
taxpayer claims as a dependent, whether as defined in § 152 or
312 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., AUDIT REP. No.
A-08-O0-10047, AUDIT OF ENUMERATION AT BIRTH PROGRAM 1(200 1), available

at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-08-0O0-10047.pdf.
313Id.;

20 C.F.R. § 422.103(b)(2), (c)(2) (as amended in 2006); SOC. SEC.

ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYS. § RM 00202.00](C)(2) (as

amended in 2002).
114 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 312, atl.
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as that definition is incorporated by reference and modified in
other Code sections. The Department of Treasury and the IRS
could further be directed to promulgate regulations ensuring that
this de jure identification and documentation requirement does
not result in taxpayers being required to unnecessarily identify
and document their dependents in multiple places on the same
return.
Once this common and uniform baseline of reporting has
been established, Congress and the IRS should revisit each of
the family tax provisions to determine whether there are valid,
articulable, and nondiscriminatory reasons for departing from
the common baseline of reporting family relationships. An
example of such an exception is described in Part I of this
Article. I suggested there that a modified version of the
exception to nominee/middleman reporting that ostensibly
already exists for dividends be honored and extended to income
produced by other jointly owned property. I advocated that the
person paying the interest, dividend, or royalty simply be
required (rather than merely permitted) to include the name,
taxpayer identification number, and ownership percentage of
joint owners on the initial Form 1099. This change would help to
ensure compliance, relieve taxpayers from an onerous and
confusing reporting burden, and make the Code more neutral
with regard to the choice of relationships by ceasing to privilege
different-sex marriage (at least in this one area).
From time to time, Congress and the IRS should pause
when reviewing these provisions. They should consider whether
the exceptions they are carving out, when taken together,
disparately impact taxpayers along the lines of class, race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or marital status. As part of
this review, Congress and the IRS should also be sure to avoid
duplicative reporting and the possibility of misleading overreporting.
Taken together, these steps would go far toward bringing
order to the identification and documentation requirements in the
Code's family tax provisions and would reduce the unacceptable
inequality in the enforcement of these provisions that currently
exists.

